Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1993

Ol Eve Loomis Davis v. Black and Decker (U.S.),
Inc. (a Maryland corporation authorized to do
business in the State of Utah, and a subsidiary of
Black and Decker Corporation, Inc.) and Black and
Decker corporation, Inc. (a Maryland corporation.)
: Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Roger P. Christensen; Christensen, Jensen & Powell; Attorneys for Appellees.
Elmer Thomas Davis, Jr.; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Davis v. Black and Decker, No. 930224 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5105

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

wmm±
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OL EVE LOOM 111 |DAVIS,
APPEAL
P l a i n |ji|ff

and

Appellant,

vs.

Case No. 920224 CA

BLACK AND IIItCfeR ( U . S . ) 5 INC, ( a
brporat ion authorized
Maryland
in the State of Utah,
to do bu s :iness
|
and a s u M idiary of Black and Decker
Corpora!i •hL Inc.)
1 and
BLACK AND D!3 O R CORPORATION, INC.
(a Mary 1 .idd corporat ion.)
Def en

\$

Appeal from Third
Judicial Court of
Salt Lake County.

The Honorable
R. H. Moffat
Dist. Ct. Judge

and Appellees.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT

A| p|a(l from the Third Judicial District Court
of Salt Lake County
The Honojj^ble

Richard H. Moffat, District Court Judge
Argument Priority: 15

Roger P . Chr i :f|t|ensen,
Bar Number: 6<

Esquire

CHRISTENSEN, ENSEN & POWELL, P,
Atty for Defer: pp,nts/Appe 1 lees
g Building
510 Clark Lear
175 South We si I temple
Salt Lake Ci 1;,;,L Utah 84101
Phone: (801 ) 31!5f3431

Elmer Thomas Davis, Jr., Esq.
Bar Number: 827
Atty for Plaint iff/Appellant
1181 Chandler Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Phone:
(801)521-9529

FILED
NOV 3 0 1993
COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OL EVE LOOMIS DAVIS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs •
APPEAL
BLACK AND DECKER (U.S.), INC. (a
Maryland Corporation authorized
to do business in the State of Utah,
and a subsidiary of Black and Decker
Corporation, Inc. )
and
BLACK AND DECKER CORPORATION, INC.
(a Maryland corporation.)

Case No. 930224 CA

Defendants and Appellees.

Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court
of Salt Lake County
The Honorable Richard H. Moffat, District Court Judge

ERRATA FOR PLAINTIFF'S/APPELLANT'S PRINCIPAL BRIEF

Roger P. Christensen, Esquire
Bar Number: 648
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL,P.C.
Atty for Defendants/Appellees
510 Clark Learning Building
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Phone: (801)355-3431

Elmer Thomas Davis,Jr., Esq.
Bar Number: 827
Atty for Plaint iff/Appellant
1181 Chandler Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Phone: (801)521-9529

Corrected
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

5

A*

Federal Cases

5

B.

Utah Cases

C.

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

6

D.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

6

E.

State Statutes

6

F.

Miscellaneous Authorities

6

*

5

JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT

7

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

7

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES

&

A.

Statutes:

8

B.

Rules of Civil Procedure

8

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

9

RELEVANT FACTS

9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
.

ARGUMENT

A.

B.
C.

18
,

18

The court erred in not requiring defendants
to answer plaintiff's Interrogatories, Set
Number 3, fully and with candor

18

The court erred in not striking the affidavit
of Dr. Leonard J. Swinyer, M.D

25

The court erred in ruling as a matter of law
that there was no genuine issue of causation
and that the defendants were therefore entitled
to a summary judgment in their favor on the
merits
32

CONCLUSION:

36

I.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES(Page references corrected)
A*

Federal Cases
1.

B.

Trane Co. v. Klutznick,
87 FRD 545 (DC WD Wis)

Pgs

8,24

State Cases

1.

Butterfield v. Okubo
831 P.2d 97(Utah 1992)

2.

Ellis v, Gilbert
19 Utah 2d 189,
429 P.2d 39(1967)

Pg 19

3.

Howick v. Bank of Salt Lake
28 Utah 2d 64,
498 P.2d 352(1972)

Pg 31

4*

Jackson v. Dabney
645 P.2d 613(Utah 1982)

Pg 33

5.

Neiderhouse Builders & Dev Co.
Pgs 7,32
v. Campbell
824 P.2d 1193(Utah Ct. App., 1992)

6.

State ex rel. Road Comm'n v. Petty
17 Utah 2d 382,
412 P.2d 914(1066)

7.

Salt Lake City Corp. v. James
Construction, Inc.
761 P.2d 42(Utah Ct. App. 1988)

30

Treloggan v. Treloggan
699 P.2d 747(Utah 1984)

C5

Pg 19

Pgs 34
Pg 31

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
1.
2.
3.

Rule 26.
Rule 33.
Rule 56.

Pgs 9,19
Pgs 8,9,14,19,23,25,26,34
Pgs 8,9,25,26,31,35

Utah State Rules of Civil Procedure.
1.
2.
3.

Rule 26.
Rule 33.
Rule 56.

Pgs

Pgs 8,19
8,9,14,19,23,25,26,34
Pgs 8,9,25,26,31,35

State Statutes
1. 78-2-2, Par (3)(j), Utah Code Annotated.
2. 78-2a-3. Par (2)(k), Utah Code
3. 78-15-1, Utah Code Annotated

Pg 8
Pg 8
Pg 8

Miscellaneous Authorities
1. Dr. John Joseph Zone, M.D.
Pgs 11,16,26
2. Dr. Leo Soteriou, M.D.
Pgs 11,16,26,27,29
3. Dr. Leonard J. Swinyer, M.D.
Pgs 7,9,16,17,
and Pgs. 18,25,26,27,28,29,30,36
4. Dr. Andrews, M.D.
5. Dr. Alexander Fisher, M.D., See
Addendum 7, deposition of Dr.
Sotiriou at Lines 9 & 10, Pg 15

C6

II.

JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT:
Title 78-2a-3,(2)(K) Utah Code Annotated

C7

Pg 9

CORRECTIONS TO REFERENCES TO THE RECORD:
The following references
to the record
in plaintiff's/
appellant's principal brief should be corrected to read as
shown:
Brief
Page
Number

Present
Reference
To Record

Line
Number
14
21
1
2
9
21
23

10
11
14
14
14
15
23

R.
R.
R.
R.
R.
R.
R.

0005
0006
0193
0195
0273
0396
0396

Reference
to the record
should read
R.
R.
R.
R.
R.
R.
R.

Add also a
Reference to
Brief Addendum
Number:

0020
0021
0225
0209
0273
0354
0354

3
4
4

MISCELLANEOUS CORRECTIONS:
Brief
Page
Number
Par II. "Par (3)(j), Title 78-2-2", should read
"Par (2)(k), Title 78-2a-3"
8

Par IV, A, 2.

"Title 78-2-2a(Par 3(k))", should read
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Soteriou, M.D., 6 March 1991.
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Joseph Zone, M.D., 7 March 1991.
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of the Record.

9.

Affidavit of Dr. Leonard J. Swinyer, M.D.,2
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10.
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Also found at Page 451 of the Record.
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II.

JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT:
Paragraph (3)(j), Title 78-2-2, Utah Code Annotated

III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES(and standard of review and supporting
author it ies).
A.

Whether or not the court erred in ruling as a matter

of law that there was no genuine issue of causation and that
the defendants were therefore entitled to summary judgment in
their favor.
Standard of review is:
In determining whether the trial court
correctly found that there was no genuine issue of
material fact, the appellate court views the facts and
all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to
the party opposing the motion. It reviews the trial
court's conclusions of law for correctness, including
its conclusion that there are no material fact issues.
\Neiderhouser Builders and Dev. Corp v.
Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193(Utah Ct . App., 1992)

B.
the

Whether or not the court erred in failing to strike

affidavit

of

Dr.

expressed an opinion

Swinyer,

defendants'

expert,

who

in support of defendants' motion

for

summary judgment.
Standard of review is:
"Supporting and opposing affidavits should be
made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall
- 7 -

show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to
testify to the matters stated therein."
Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

C.

Whether or not

the district

court erred

requiring defendants to answer plaintiff's

in not

Interrogatories,

Set Number 3, fully and with candor as required by Rule 33(a),
URCP.
Standard of review is:
"Each interrogatory shall be answered
separately and fully in writing under oath, unless
unless it is objected to, in which event the reasons for
objections shall be stated in lieu of an answer."
Rule 33(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
"Party must give full and complete answers to
interrogatory served on him by another party; while he
does not have duty to search out new information, party
has duty to provide all information available to him;
information which is controlled by party is availabe to
him."
Trane Co. v. Klutznick, 87 FRD 545 (DC WD Wis)
IV. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES.
A. Statutes:
1. Title 78-2-2, Par 3(j), Utah Code Annotated.
2. Title 78-2-2a,(par 3(k), Utah Code Annotated.
2. Title 78-15-1, Utah Code Annotated.
B. Rules of Civil Procedure
1. Utah Rules.
a. Rule 26, URCP.
- 8 -

b. Rule 33, URCP.
c. Rule 56, URCP.
2. Federal Rules.
a. Rule 26, FRCP.
b. Rule 33, FRCP.
c. Rule 56, FRCP.
V.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
This is a products liability case, Title 28-15-1 UCA, in

which plaint iff/appellant
hidden defects in

alleges that

she was

injured by

"The Classic" metal steam iron which had

been manufactured by the defendants and that defendants failed
to warn of any hidden dangers.(Amended Complaint, Number 1,
Page 017 of the Record)

The case was in the discovery phase

when the court awarded defendants a summary judgment on the
merits based largely on the affidavit of Dr. Swinyer and the
fact that plaint iff/appe1lant
counter

affidavit

theory

of

which

had not provided an expert's

supported

causation.(Summary

plaintiff's/appellant's
Judgment,

Addendum

1.

Defendants'/Appe1 lees' Motion for Summary Judgment, Page 357
of the Record, Defendants'/Appe1 lees' Memorandum in Support of
their Motion for Summary Judgment, Addendum 2)
VI.

RELEVANT FACTS
A.

Defendants

are

related

public

corporations

of

worldwide scope. One is the subsidiary of the other. They

- 9

-

manufacture and distribute on a global scale industrial tools
and home appliances including the metal steam iron bearing the
trade name
Brazil

"The Classic" which defendants manufactured

and

sold

in

Salt

Lake

City,

Utah,

and

in

which

plaint iff/appe1lant alleges caused her injuries.
B.

Certain

electrical

sealants, coatings, fluxes, thermal

insulations

formulations

are

which

are

manufactured

into

essentially
"The

and

chemical

Classic",

the

identities of some of which are still unknown to plaintiff.
(Such sealants, coatings, etc. have and will, for brevity, be
referred

to

by

the

parties

as

"chemicals

in

the

iron",

"chemical products", or simply "chemicals" or variations of
such terminology.) (Amended Complaint, Number 1, Par 9, Page
005 of the Record;

2 Par, Page 210 of the Record; Affidavit

of Elmer T. Davis, Jr., Page 220 of the Record;

Letter of

Roger Christensen, Page 659 of the Record.)
C.

Plaintiff/appe1lant alleges she purchased and used

"The Classic" metal steam iron in Utah. While cleaning and
using "The Classic" she breathed fumes (a combination of the
vapors of all of the chemicals present in the iron when it was
heated) which emanated from the iron, and her skin was exposed
to chemicals which were designed and manufactured

into the

iron.

of

In

the

process

of

steam

ironing,

certain

such

chemicals were transferred to her clothing by the water/steam
- 10

-

and thence to her skin when she would wear the ironed clothing
next to her skin. She alleges that it was due to breathing
the vapors and the contact with the chemicals that she was
injured and suffered damages. Plaintiff's skin condition was
diagnosed as contact dermatitis, (Dr. Soteriou Deposition,
Page 14, Lines 9 & 18, Addendum 7; Dr. Zone Deposition, Page
26, Lines 5, 6, & 7, Addendum 8) which occurs when the skin
comes in contact with substances to which the skin reacts. (The
only cure

for

contact dermatitis

is the avoidance

of

the

chemicals to which the skin reacts from exposure.(Dr. Soteriou
Deposition, Lines 22 thru 24, Page 22, Addendum 7)

Plaintiff

alleges that defendants failed in their duty to manufacture an
iron

without

hidden

dangers

and

failed

to warn

of

such

dangers; further, when specifically asked about the chemicals
designed

into

the

iron, defendants

refused

to reveal

the

identities of the chemicals. Plaintiff/Appe1lant must be able
to show that not only did she react to said chemical but that
her contact with the chemical came about by transfer of that
chemical from the defendants' iron to her skin in the way she
theorizes. (Amended Complaint, Number 1, Paragraphs 12 and 13,
Page 006 of the Record; Deposition of 01 Eve Loomis Davis,
Lines 12 through 22, Page 47, Addendum 6 ) .
D.

Plaintiff/appe1lant issued her Interrogatories, Set

Number 3, 25 February 1991, in which she asked in the first
- 11

-

interrogatory that defendants "list the technical names of all
of the sealants, coatings, fluxes, electrical

and

thermal

insulations" and certain other identified chemicals used in
"The Classic", along with "the specifications by which each is
procured."

(See Plaintiff's

Interrogatories, Set Number 3,

Page 656 of the Record.))
E.

The reasons for this interrogatory were: The only

treatment

for

contact

dermatitis

is the avoidance

of

the

chemicals to which the skin reacts, and proof that a causal
relationship exists between chemicals emanating from the iron
and the injury suffered by the plaintiff requires knowledge of
all of the chemicals implicated.
be

tested

and

eliminated

Each chemical must in turn

as a cause or

identified

as an

offending chemical. She must be able to show that not only did
she react to said offending chemical but that her contact with
the chemical came about by transfer of that chemical from the
defendants' iron to her body and skin in the way she stated.
F.

"Defendants, in their arguments in this case, from

time to time, and particularly in the Memorandum in Support of
their Motion for Summary Judgment(Addendum 2), have made much
of the 'highly technical questions of medicine and chemistry'
(Defendants' Memorandum

in

Support

of

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment, Page 2, Line 8, first full paragraph and Page 7,
Line 2, First Paragraph of Argument.), the 'Complex medical
- 12

-

and chemical issues'(Defendants Memorandum, Page 11, Line 9
last paragraph), and the 'complexity of plaintiff's medical
condition'(Defendants'

Memorandum,

Page

11, Line

5,

last

paragraph), for the purpose of proving to the court that the
issues in this case require a high degree of technical and
scientific thought and analysis, and therefore, the testimony
of experts."

Thus showing agreement with plaintiff that the

issues in this case require analysis and evaluation based on
information gained through technical and scientific methods*
G.

Defendants/Appellees did not furnish their answers

to this set of interrogatories until 15 May 1991, some 45 days
late, wherein

they expressed

no objections

to plaintiff's

interrogatories; neither did they, in their answers, account
for all such chemicals manufactured into their iron. (Cert, of
Service

of

Defendants' Answers

Interrogatories,

Set

Defendants'/Appe1 lees'

Number

to

3,

Answers

Plaintiff's/Appellant's

Page

200

thereto,

of

the

Record;

Page

663

of

the

Record. )
H.
court

for

Plaint iff/Appellant, on 12 June 1991, moved the
an

order

to

compel

more

complete

answers

to

Interrogatories, Set Number 3, and specifically asked for an
accounting of all such chemicals, thereby expressing objection
to defendants' answers to her Interrogatories, Set Number 3.

- 13

-

(Plaintiff's Motion, Page 193 of the Record and Supporting
Memorandum, Page 195 of the Record.)
I*

On

plaintiff's

8 November

motion

compromise,

to

1991,

the

compel. At

plaintiff

agreed

hearing

the

to

held

on

hearing, by way

of

accept,

was

in

lieu

of

specifications, the names of the suppliers of such chemicals,
but she still expected to obtain the names of the chemicals
identified
entry

in the interrogatory. The judge, in his minute

dated,

granted

8 November

plaintiff's

1991, (Page

motion

to

273 of

compel,

but

defendants to prepare the order. Plaintiff's

the

Record)

designated
attorney,

in

telephone conversation with the judge, obtained permission to
submit

a

proposed

orders. Plaintiff

order. Both
objected

parties

submitted

proposed

to defendants' proposed

order.

(Page 274 of the Record)
J.

The court, on

20 November 1991, signed defendants'

proposed order which granted plaintiff's motion to compel, but
limited the information defendants were required to furnish
and thereby gave defendants/appellees

license to ignore the

requirement of Rule 33(a) of both URCP and FRCP that
interrogatory

be

answered

separately

and

fully

"each
in

writ ing,! . (Page 283 of the Record)
K.

In a letter to the court dated, 21 November 1991,

- 14

-

(apparently written without
already

signed

defendants'

attorney, in an effort
version

of

previously

knowledge

the

supplied

proposed

to further

court's

that

order,

information

the

order)

court

defendants'

argue for his
furnished

tending

had

proposed

some

largely

to anticipate

his

response to the order to be signed by the court. In the letter
he also admitted that he had not furnished the identities of
all of the chemicals manufactured

into the iron. Later he

argued that this letter should be taken as his compliance with
the court's order.(Ltr. to the Court from Roger Christensen,
Page

659

Opposition

of
to

the

Record;

Defendants'/Appe1 lees'

Plaintiff's/Appellee's

Motion

Memo

for

in

Formal

Compliance with the Court's Order, Page 326 of the Record.)
L.

Plaint iff/appellant, on 14 May 1992, when it had

become obvious that defendants were not going to respond to
the court's order, moved the court

for an order

compelling

formal compliance with the court's order of 20 November 1991.
The court, on 6 July 1992, granted plaintiff's motion, but
then dictated what

the defendants' answer should be, thus

limiting their answers to information which had already been
made known. (Minute Entry, Page 396 of the Record)

By so

doing, the court again bypassed the requirement of Rule 33(a)
that interrogatories be answered "fully".

- 15
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By giving license

to defendants/appellees to ignore the rule the court denied
the plaintiff the benefit of discovery by interrogatory.
M.

Plaint iff/Appe1lant had been seen by Dr. Soteriou,

Dr. Zone, Dr. Lieferman and Dr. Swinyer. Dr. Soteriou was her
treating physician. All are board certified Dermatologists.
Defendants/Appellees have cited each of these as experts for
the purpose of disproving causation and plaintiff/appe1lant
has consistently objected. (Deposition of Dr. Zone, Line 14,
Page 8, Addendum 8; Deposition of Dr. Soteriou, Line 20, Page
20, Addendum 7)

While each is an expert in the field of

dermatology, none has been shown to have personal knowledge of
the facts necessary for determining causation in this case.
N.

Defendants/Appellees, on 6 August 1992, moved for

Summary Judgment based largely on the affidavit of Dr. Leonard
Swinyer, M.D., defendants' alleged expert, and on the the fact
that plaintiff/appe1 lant had not "proved causation."(Page 357
of the Record)
O.

Plaint iff/appe1lant, on 25 August 1992, moved the

court to strike the affidavit of Dr. Swinyer(Page 451 of the
Record) for the reason that he did not state in his affidavit
that he had come to his opinion expressed therein by personal
knowledge of the identities
manufactured

into

plaintiff's

specific

of the chemicals designed

"The Classic", by personal
reaction
- 16
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lack

and

knowledge

thereof

to

of

such

chemicals, by personal knowledge that no chemical designed and
manufactured into the iron could have transferred from the
iron to the skin of the plaintiff as she alleges happened,
and/or by personal knowledge that, if certain chemicals from
the iron had been so transported to plaintiff's skin, they did
not

cause

plaintiff's

injuries. Although

Dr. Swinyer

did

express an opinion that he thought plaintiff's skin condition
was

more

likely

formaldehyde

to

have

manufactured

been
into

caused

her

by

exposure

clothing,

he

to

did

not

indicate in his affidavit that he had personal knowledge that
the

clothes

manufactured
defendants'
causation,

plaintiff
with

had

actually

been

formaldehyde • The very

"experts"

from being

is virtually

the same

fact

competent
fact

wearing
that

were
keeps

to testify

that

has

on

prevented

plaintiff from obtaining experts able to testify in support of
her theory of causation* That fact

is that defendants have

kept hidden from their experts the knowledge of the identities
of all of the chemicals implicated by plaintiff's allegations.
P.

At the hearing on defendants' motion for Summary

Judgment, plaintiff offered to submit evidence to show that an
arrangement

had

been

plaintiff's

theory

of

made

with

causation,

experts
but

on

who

would

test

objection

from

defendants, the court disallowed admission of such evidence*
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Q.

At the hearing on defendants' motion for Sumnary

Judgment, plaintiff moved the court that such Summary Judgment
be issued without prejudice to plaintiff.
R.

The court granted Summary Judgment, on the merits,

in defendants'/appe1 lees' favor on 9 November 1992.(Addendum
1)

VII.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

A. The court erred in not requiring defendants/appellees
to answer plaintiff's interrogatories, Set Number 3, fully and
with candor.

B. The court erred in not striking the affidavit of Dr.
Leonard J. Swinyer, M.D.

C. The court erred in ruling as a matter of law that the
defendants/appellees

were

entitled

to summary

judgment

in

their favor.

VIII.

ARGUMENT

A* The court erred in not requiring defendants to answer
plaintiff's interrogatories, Set Number 3, fully and with
candor.
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Rule
33(a),
URCP
&
FRCP,
states:
"Each
interrogatory shall be answered separately and fully in
writing under oath, unless it is objected to, in which event
the reasons for objections shall be stated in lieu of an
answer.
Rule 26(a) "Parties may obtain discovery by • . .;
written interrogatories; . . •" and Rule 26(a)(1) Parties may
obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
act ion,• . •"
"The frequency or extent of use of discovery methods
set forth in Subdivision (a) shall be limited by the court if
it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably
cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other
source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less
expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample
opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the
information sought; or(iii) the discovery is unduly burdensome
or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the
amount in controversy, limitations on the parties' resources,
and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation.
The court may act upon its own initiative after reasonable
notice or pursuant to a motion under Subdivision (c).
1. "The purposes of discovery rules are to make
discovery as simple and efficient as possible by eliminating
unnecessary technicalities, and to remove elements of surprise
or trickery so the parties and the court can determine the
facts and resolve the issues as directly, fairly and
expeditionsly as possible." Ellis v. Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 199,
429 P.2d 39(1967)
2. "Discovery should be liberally permitted where
it is used in eliminating non-controversial matters and in
identifying, narrowing and clarifying the issues on which
contest may prove to be necessary. State ex rel. Road Comm'n
v. Petty, 17 Utah 2d 382, 412 P.2d 914(1966)
3.
future

It is extremely important, both for plaintiff's

health,

sensitization,

with
and

for

respect
the

avoidance,

purpose

of

and

possible

establishing

or

disproving causation in this case, that the chemicals which
- 19
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were manufactured into defendants' "The Classic" metal steam
iron be

identified.

causation, she must

In order

for

the plaintiff

to

prove

first know the names of the chemicals

which could have caused her skin to react. Their identities
should

not

be

an

issue,

particularly

when

defendants'/appe1 lees expressed no objections to furnishing
such information in their answers to plaintiff's/appellant's
interrogatories.

Plaintiff/appe1lant must show that her skin

reacts to one or more of the identified chemicals, finally,
she must be able to show that those chemicals to which she
reacted had indeed migrated from the iron to her skin during
use of the iron. Defendants' experts, on the other hand, need
to know the identities of the chemicals manufactured into "The
Classic", so they can evaluate those chemicals as to how they
affect plaintiff's skin, so they can evaluate the mechanism by
which plaintiff alleges the chemicals migrated from the iron
to her skin, and so they may develop alternate explanations if
that

is

necessary.

If

the

court

does

not

require

the

defendants to provide the names of the chemicals manufactured
into

the

iron,

the plaintiff

is

forced

to determine

the

identities of such chemicals through scientific analysis. To
cause such analysis to be done to identify samples of unknown
chemicals is economically impossible for the plaintiff, and
there is no guarantee that she would succeed in identifying
- 20
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the chemicals if she were able to afford to buy such analysis.
The logical solution therefore was to obtain the information
from

defendants

defendants

of

by

use

of

furnishing

interrogatories.

the

identities

of

The
the

cost

to

chemicals

manufactured into "The Classic", by comparison is negligible.
(Cost comparison, Page 448 of the record)
identities

of

such

chemicals

does

not

Knowledge of the
win

the

case

for

plaint iff/appellant, but merely furnishes a starting point
from which she may proceed to prove causation as she alleges.
Not having the names of the chemicals manufactured

into the

iron effectively dooms her case.
4.
business

on

Defendants
an

are

related

international

scale,

headquarters are

in Maryland, U.S.A..

steam

plaintiff

iron which

corporations

alleges

their

doing

corporate

"The Classic" metal

caused

her

injury was

manufactured in Brazil. This case is therefore one in which
defendants are some 2000 miles away from the plaintiff. Their
manufacturing

plant

is

some

4000

miles

in

a

different

direction from Salt Lake City, and since Portuguese is the
language

of

Brazil,

there

Defendants'appe1 lees sell

is

their

a

language

products

barrier.

in Utah and

the

expect to continue to do so indefinitely, so they should be
expected to furnish whatever information is necessary which is
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not privileged. They have not claimed privilege for any of the
information sought by plaintiff.
5.

In the interest of economy of time and expense

for both defendants and plaintiff, and because of the simple
straight forward information sought and because the identities
of

the

chemicals

involved

are

under

the

control

of

the

defendants and readily available, it would seem that this case
would be the very kind of case in which use of interrogatories
would be ideally suited. Use of interrogatories was supposed
to minimize the problems associated with taking depositions
across

a

language

barrier

and

over

the

great

distances

involved and to conserve the time of those being deposed.
6.

As it has turned out, even on objection by

plaint i ff/appe 1 lant , the court did not see fit to require
defendants to give full and complete answers to plaintiff's
interrogatories, and plaintiff never did learn the identities
of all of the chemicals used in the iron to which her skin
could have reacted.

Without such information, no scientific

tests could be performed,

and no "expert", plaintiff's

or

defendants', could develop a credible opinion, which confirmed
or refuted plaintiff's allegation of causation.
7.

The court exceeded

its descretion when it

failed to require defendants to respond "fully" to plaintiff's
interrogatories in the following respects:
- 22
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a.

When defendants answers to plaintiff's

interrogatories were submitted 45 days late, with incomplete
answers, and without

objection

to

the

interrogatories

as

required by Rule 33(a), the court erred in not requiring full
and

complete

answers

to

such

interrogatories

when

plaint iff/appellant objected.
b.

When the court granted plaintiff's motion

for more complete answers(Minute Entry, 8 November 1991, Page
273 of the record), the
order,

and

therefore

court erred

the

in not requiring

defendants

answers,

to

its
meet

plaintiff's objections and to reflect the substance of the
motion as argued by plaintiff which asked for an accounting of
all of the chemicals manufactured into the iron which could
have caused plaintiff's injury. The court erred when it did
not state in its minute entry its reasons for not requiring
defendants to answer plaintiff's interrogatories fully.
c.

When the court granted plaintiff's motion

for formal compliance with the court's order of 20 November
1991, the court

erred

in not

requiring answers which met

plaintiff's objections and were full and complete. The court's
minute entry of 6 July 1992, at Page 2, line 4, states, "The
court is of the opinion that the defendant's compliance with
the Court's November 20, 1991 Order, Page 396 of the Record)
was in good faith and complete to the extent it could be.
- 23
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The

court does not agree with plaintiff's characterization of the
defendant's discovery as being inacurate or nonverifiable."
The court went on to state at Line 6 of the second paragraph,
"Parties are not

required

to do the legal work for other

parties nor are they required to seek out information that can
just

as

easily

be

obtained

by

the

party

asking

for

the

discovery." These comments are the only clues to the thinking
of the court found in the record, and they were expressed to
justify imposition of sanctions against plaintiff's attorney,
but they bear on the question of why the court did not see fit
to require defendants to answer plaintiff's

interrogatories

fully.
d.
opinion

that

When the court says, "The court is of the

the

defendant's

compliance

with

the

Court's

November 20, 1991 Order was in good faith and complete to the
extent it could be,"

the court indicates that it used the

wrong criterion to exclude the information being sought. The
proper criterion is expressed in Trane Co. v. Klutznick , 87
FRD 545(DC WD Wis), where it states "Party must give full and
complete answers to interrogatory served on him by another
party;

while

information,

he

does

party

not

has

have

duty

to

duty

to

provide

search
all

out

new

information

available to him; information which is controlled by party is
available to him."

The

information sought by
- 24
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plaintiff's

first interrogatory of Set Number 3,

Page 656 of the Record)

is controlled by defendants. The information sought does not
require defendants to create new information, all they must do
is retrieve the already existing information from their files.
Defendants

did

information

not

called

answering it.
interrogatory

express
for

by

objection
the

to

furnishing

interrogatory

in

the

lieu

of

Rule 33a, URCP & FRCP, requires that "each
shall

be

answered

separately

and

fully

in

writing under oath, unless it is objected to, in which event
the reasons for objectionss shall be stated
answer.

However,

incomplete

defendants,

answers,

have,

in

in lieu of an

since

they

submitted

their

arguments

on

their
various

motions throughout the progress of this case, given excuses
for

not

furnishing

complete

answers

and

have

thereby

influenced the court. These excuses, however, should carry no
weight; they are nothing more than tardy objections.

B. The court erred in not striking the affidavit of
Dr. Leonard Swinyer, M. D.(Plaint iff's Motion to Strike, 25
August 2992, Page 451 of the Record)
Rule 56(e), URCP & FRCP, states: "Supporting
and opposing affidavits should be made on personal knowledge,
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence,
and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to
testify to the matters stated therein."
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1.

Facts essential to proving causation which are

at issue:
a. Plaint iff/Appe1lant alleges that certain
chemicals were manufactured into defendants' MThe Classic"
metal steam iron. She demonstrated that are at least 12 sites
within the iron at which there were components essentially
chemical in nature. (Affidavit, Page 220 of the Record) She
sought the identities of such chemicals by way of her
Interrogatories, Set Number 3. She was denied such information
when the court failed to require defendants to answer said
interrogatories fully as required by Rule 33(a), URCP & FRCP.
(1) An "expert" requires a knowledge of
all of said chemicals to demonstrate that any one of them is
capable
of
causing
contact
dermatitis
in
the
plaint iff/appe1lant, or that none of them are so capable,
(2) An "expert" requires a knowledge of
all of said chemicals to demonstrate that any or all of them
could, or, from defendants' point of view, could not, have,
migrated from iron to plaintiff's skin as she alleges.
(3) Finally, even if one or more of said
chemicals were shown to have so migrated, it must be shown
that defendant's skin does or does not react to the quantities
of the chemical which ultimately reach her skin.
2.

Dr. Swinyer is not competent to testify as an

expert with respect to causation in this case, because
affidavit fails to show "affirmatively that

his

the affiant is

competent to testify to the matters stated therein." (Rule
56(e), URCP & FRCP.)

Dr. Swinyer testifies that (to form his

opinion) he reviewed the medical history and photographs of
plaintiff/appellant, the records of Dr. Soteriou, Dr. John
Zone, Dr. Glen K. Lund, the depositions of Drs. Soteriou and
Zone,

Statements

and

information

furnished

by

plaint iff/appellant. (Affidavit of Dr. Swinyer, Page 461 of
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the Record)

Note

that

he

does not

make

any

statement

indicating that he knew identities of the chemical components
of "The Classic" metal steam iron; certainly he couldn't have
received such information from any of the sources mentioned
above.

Plaintiff/Appe1lant does not know the identities of

the chemicals in the iron to this day. Neither Dr. Swinyer nor
any of his sources have said that defendants\appe 1 lees have
identified the chemical components manufactured into the iron
for them for consideration. Dr. Soteriou denied knowledge of
the iron and didn't think the information important enough to
record,

and

said

he

couldn't

(form

and

opinion

about

causation) without knowing "what is in the iron". (Deposition
of Dr. Soteriou, Lines 15 & 16, Page 16;
19, and Lines 23 & 24, Page 21,
3.

Lines 12-22, Page

Addendum 7)

Dr. Swinyer, at Par 8 of his affidavit, makes

his most telling pronouncement of his opinion when he says,
". . . it is my opinion that Mrs. Davis' skin conditions,
(which she has described and as depicted in the photographs
which she

supplied), were not

the

result of

chemicals or

chemical compounds emitted from the Black & Decker iron which
she describes
lacks

any

in her deposition". The

credibility,

because

Dr.

statement, however,
Swinyer

has

affirmatively stated that he knows the identities, or
specific

characteristics,

of

the

- 27
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"chemicals

or

not
the

chemical

compounds"

found in the Black and Decker iron. (Dr. Swinyer

Affidavit, Addendum 9)
4.

Dr. Swinyer makes his next and last important

opinion statement at Paragraph 10 in which he states, ". . .
I believe that her (plaint iff/appellant) pre-existing contact
eczema and/or contact dermatitis may have been produced by
formaldehyde resins commonly found
women's clothing."
immaterial

This

in some fabrics used in

is a nice observation, but

to the question of

causation

in this

it is

case. It

refers to a prior occurrance, and at best he can say only that
her condition
relevance

to

"may" have been
the

present

so caused. If there

case,

(i.e.

the

skin

is any

condition

allegedly caused by defendants'/appellees' iron) he does not
explain it, but even if there were relevance, if he is stating
that all of plaintiff's/appellant's injuries can be attributed
to "formaldehyde resins commonly found in some fabrics used in
women's

clothing",

he

has

failed

to

state

that

he

has

investigated, or made tests or referred to tests designed to
establish

that,

the

clothing

habitually

worn

by

plaintiff/appe1lant, the clothing being worn by plaintiff at
the time of the incident which precipitated this case, or the
clothing she has worn since the incident while her skin was
broken

out

contained

formaldehyde.

Neither

has

he

made

allowance for the fact he recognizes in his Paragraph 6. He
- 28
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says her skin cleared up "spontaneously", but if there were
formaldehyde in her clothing before her skin cleared up, there
must have been formaldehyde in her clothing after her skin
cleared up. He doesn't explore why her skin cleared up.

She

had told him her skin cleared after she stopped using the
iron. Dr. Soteriou testifies that when the topical agent is
removed, (contact) dermatitis clears up. (Lines 22-24, Page
22, Addendum 7)
5. Dr. Swinyer's affidavit does not indicate on its
face that Dr. Swinyer knew anything about nThe Classic" metal
steam iron or, for that matter, that he had even seen one. The
affidavit does not indicate that defendants/appellees informed
him of the identities of the chemicals which were designed
into

the

iron.

He

does

not

indicate

he

knows

the

characteristics of the chemicals in the iron. He doesn't say
that he conducted tests, or read about tests,

which proved

the chemicals which originated in the iron could not have been
transported to plaintiff's skin as she alleges, nor does he
say that even if the chemicals were so transported that they
did not or could not cause plaintiff's injuries.

The best

that can be said for Dr. Swinyer's affidavit testimony is that
he

has

expressed

assessment

without

a

very

any

unscientific

personal

top

knowledge

of

the

bearing

on

head
the

specific facts of this case as they relate to whether or not
- 29
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the chemicals in the iron caused plaintiff's injuries. How can
he say the chemicals in the iron did not cause plaintiff's
injuries, if he does not know what chemicals are in the iron?
He does not say defendants have informed him of the chemicals
he considered. How can he say that the chemicals did not
migrate to plaintiff's skin in the way she describes, if he
does not know which chemicals are involved or if he has never
performed, or

read about, an appropriate

demonstrates that point?

experiment

which

He sites none. How can he state that

even if the offending chemical so migrated it would be in such
minute quantity that plaintiff would not react, unless he had
personal experience regarding that chemical born of experiment
or reading? He states in his affidavit that it is his opinion
that

plaintiff's

injuries were

"more

likely

to have

been

caused by the formaldehyde in the clothes she was wearing",
but he does not say that he knows what clothes she was wearing
at

the

time,

formaldehyde

or

that

he

knew

that

such

clothes

component, or even

that

he knew she

had

a

reacted

specifically to formaldehyde." His testimony on all points is
therefore nothing more than knee jerk conjecture of the type
all of us make when asked to express an opinion on a subject
about which we are not familiar, and the defendants/appellees
want the court to accept Dr. Swinyer's affadavit testimony as
that of an expert on causation.
- 30

The Affidavit of Dr. Swinyer
-

fails

the

test

of

Rule

56(a)

with

respect

to

personal

knowledge and competency to testify about the facts essential
to a ruling on causation in this case. His testimony in his
affidavit is largely immaterial to the essential issues raised
by defendants' motion for summary judgment.
6.

His affidavit is, therefore, not admissible to

disprove that plaintiff's injuries were caused by defendants'
iron. Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747(Utah, 1985), and,
therefore, subject to a motion to strike. Howick v. Bank of
Utah, 28 Utah 2d 64, 498 P.2d 353[2]( 1972).
7.

The affidavit of Dr. Swinyer

better than no expert affadavit

at all, and

causation

be

cannot

be

said

to

, then, is no

settled,

the issue of
even

though

plaintiff/appe1lant could not produce a supporting affidavit
from an "expert".
8.
plaintiff's

The
motion

court
to

erred

in not

strike when

directly

it granted

ruling

on

defendants'

motion for Summary Judgment. In effect, of course, plaintiff's
motion was denied and thus the court erred.
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C. The court erred in ruling as a matter of law that
there was no genuine issue of causation and that the
defendants were therefore entitled to a summary judgment in
their favor on the merits.
(Summary Judgment, 14 October
1992. Page 593 of the Record, Addendum 1; Minute Entry, 2
October 1992. Page 359 of the Record, Addendum 5 ) .
In determining whether the trial
court correctly found that there was no genuine
issue of material fact, the appellate court views
the facts and all reasonable inferences in a light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion. It
reviews the trial court's conclusions of law for
correctness, including its conclusion that there
are no material fact issues.
\Neiderhouser Builders and Dev. Corp v.
Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193(Utah App. Ct., 1992)

1.
chemicals

Plaintiff

originating

in

alleges that

one or more of said

defendants'

iron

is the

culprit

chemical. She therefore must determine the identities of such
chemicals. She has been prevented from obtaining, through her
interrogatories,

the names of

said

chemicals. Defendants'

experts have not been told the names of said chemicals either.
Neither party's experts can proceed without such knowledge.
This fact keeps the issue of causation unresolved, but the
names of the chemicals manufactured into the iron are readily
available to defendants, and they should be required to make
them available to plaintiff/appe1lant.
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2.

Plaint iff/appe1lant

alleges that the culprit

chemical migrated to her skin. She therefore must demonstrate
that such migration did or could occur, while the defendants
must convince a jury that it did not or could not occur.
fact keeps the issue of causation unresolved.

This

Once plaintiff

has the identities of the chemicals, it should be relatively
easy to demonstrate the validity of her allegations. If the
plaintiff

fails to demonstrate

her theory of migration

of

chemicals, she must lose this case.

3.

Finally plaint iff/appe1lant

alleges that the

culprit chemical, after so migrating, caused her injury.

She

must therefore demonstrate that in fact this did happen, while
defendants

must

only

react

to the

results

of

plaintiff's

demonstration. If plaintiff does not succeed in showing that
her skin reacted to one or more of the chemicals originating
from defendants' iron, she must lose this case.

4.

(1)

Defendants'

motion

for

Summary

Judgment raised the issue, "Is there a triable issue of fact
relative to causation?

A genuine issue of fact exists were,

on the basis of the facts in the record, reasonable minds
could differ. . . ,f Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P2d 613(Utah 1982).
In order for non-moving party to oppose successfully a motion
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for summary judgment and send the issue to a fact-finder, it
is not necessary for the party to prove its legal theory; it
is

only

necessary

for

non-moving

party

to

show

facts

controverting the facts stated in moving party's affidavit.
Salt Lake City Corporation, v. Janes Construction, Inc., 761
P.2d 41(Utah Ct. App. 1988)

5.

If plaint iff/appellant, at the time of Summary

Judgment, had not proved causation, it was due to the fact
that

the

court

did

not

require

defendants

to answer

her

Interrogatories, Set Number 3, "fully" as required by Rule
33(a), URCP & FRCP.

6.

If plaint iff/appe1lant, at the time of Summary

Judgment, did not have an expert to testify by affidavit that
it was his opinion that her injuries were caused by chemicals
manufactured into defendants' iron, it was because, without
the

names

of

the

chemicals

designed

into

the

iron,

plaint if f/appe 1.1 ant was forced to go through some sort of
chemical analysis to identify samples of said chemicals taken
from an iron similar

to the culprit

iron.

It soon became

evident that to finance such analysis was economically not
feasible, and she was advised that such analysis could not be
guaranteed to provide the identities of the actual chemicals
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involved.

The

economic black

whole
hole.

process

had

Without

all

the

earmarks

the names of

the

of

an

chemicals

manufactured into defendants5 iron, no expert could be in a
position to bring his experience to bear on the problems of
proof of plaintiff's allegations.
court,

in

its willingness

to

This demonstrates that the

accept

defendants'

expert's

affidavit to support a Summary Judgment, was operating under
a double standard. It was perfectly all right for defendants'
expert

to form

an opinion

about

causation which was

not

scientifically based, had no basis in personal knowledge and
at best reported only on generalities which had only limited
relevance, if any, to the facts of causation, but the court
denied to plaintiff/appe1lant the very information her experts
needed to form a scientifically sound opinion about her theory
of causation.
7.

Plaintiff/appe1lant did all she could do; she

offered her own affidavit, born of personal knowledge,

which

explained her situation. (Affidavit, Page 558 of the Record.)
"(f) When affidavits are unavailable.
Should it
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition,
the court may refuse the application for judgment or
may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or deposition to be taken or discovery to be
had or may make such other order as is just. Rule
56(F), URCP, Summary Judgment.
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8.

The fact of the matter is that with respect to

causation, it cannot be said as a matter of law that there is
no unresolved issue. Defendants' expert's affidavit and the
absence of an affidavit by plaintiff's expert does not resolve
the

issue, because

the affidavit

of defendants/appellees'

expert should have been stricken and the court should have
disallowed

defendants'

motion

Plaint if f/appe 1 lant has not

for

Summary

had her day

Judgment.

in court

on

this

issue, nor an opportunity to prove her theory of causation.

IX.

CONCLUSION:

A.

If

the

plaintiff/appe1lant

Appellate
was

Court

erroneously

agrees

deprived

that
of

full

the
and

complete answers to her Interrogatories, Set Number 3, then it
should

agree

that

the

court

erred

in

granting

Summary

Judgment.

B.

If the Appellate Court agrees that the trial court

erred in failing to strike the Affidavit of Dr. Swinyer, then
it should agree that the trial court erred in granting Summary
Judgment.
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C.

If the Appellate

Court agrees that

the issue of

causation has not been resolved, then it should agree that the
trial court erred in granting Summary Judgment.

D.

Wherefore, the Appellate Court should find that the

trial court erred in granting Summary Judgment on the merits,
reverse such Summary Judgment and return the case to the trial
court

for

further

defendants/appellees

discovery
must

with

instructions

furnish plaint iff/appe1lant

that
with

accurate scientific and/or trade names of all of the chemical
products used at the sites within the iron identified in the
Affidavit by Elmer T. Davis, Jr., Page 455 of the record and
the names and addresses of their manufacturers or suppliers.

SUBMITTED this the

^^^k^^?

fas D a v i s , J r . , E s q u i r e
t o r n e y for P l a i n t i f f / A p p e 1 l a n t
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OCT H 1392
Roger P. Christensen, #0648
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
Attorney for Black and Decker
510 Clark Learning Building
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-3431

fCj^t^fe^

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
! OL EVE LOOMIS DAVIS,
Plaintiff,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

! vs.
BLACK AND DECKER (U.S.), INC.,
(a Maryland corporation
authorized to do business in
the State of Utah, and a subsidiary of Black and Decker
Corporation, Inc. and BLACK and
DECKER CORPORATION, INC., (a
Maryland corporation,

Civil No. 89-0907651 CV
Judge Moffat

Defendants.

Defendants7 motion for summary judgment came on for
i

( hearing before the Honorable Richard H. Moffat of the above! entitled court on October 2, 1992. Roger P. Christensen appeared
on behalf of defendant and Elmer T. Davis appeared on behalf of
, plaintiff.
!

The

court

having

considered

the

oral

arguments of

; counsel; the memoranda and affidavits submitted by the parties; and
having further considered the pleadings, depositions and record in
the case, and being fully advised in the premises, and it appearing

that defendant's motion for summary judgment is well taken and that
it should be granted;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Summary
Judgment is granted in favor of defendants and against plaintiff in
this action.
DATED this

l£

^
day of October, 1992.

_
B Y T;~

J/
~" ~

f(icti<}±# H/.
District/Covvfc^/ Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Summary
Judgment

has been mailed, postage prepaid,

following this

/3ffi^

addressed

to the

day of October, 1992:

Elmer T. Davis, Jr.
1181 Chandler Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103

\y./*Mfi
MAh "rjfc

hsu*

~ -ruiQ IS A TRUE, COPY
OF AN
I CERTIFY THAT-THIS»S^«»
N T HE THIRD

DISTRICT l g55ir l *
STATEOFUTAH'
DATE:

-2-

Tab 2

Roger P. Christensen, ==0648
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
Attorney for Black and Decker
510 Clark Learning Building
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 3 55-34 31
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
OL EVE LOOMIS DAVIS,
Plaintiff,

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
BLACK AND DECKER (U.S.)/ INC.,
(a Maryland corporation
authorized to do business in
the State of Utah, and a subsidiary of Black and Decker
Corporation, Inc. and BLACK and
DECKER CORPORATION, INC., (a
Maryland corporation,

Civil No. 89-0907651 CV
Judge Moffat

Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
defendants hereby move the Court for summary judgment in their
favor and against plaintiff.
This motion is based upon the ground that the record in
this case establishes that defendants are entitled

to summary

judgment as a matter of law.
This motion

is also based upon the Affidavit of Dr.

Leonard J. Swinyer and the memorandum of points and authorities
filed herewith.
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DATED this

day of August, 1992
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN' & POWELL, P.C.
By. /
Roger, P. Christensen
Attorneys for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I do hereby certify that a copy of Motion for Summary
Judgment has been mailed, postage prepaid, addressed
following this

day of August, 1992:
Elmer T. Davis, Jr.
1181 Chandler Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103

u

yfc

to the

Roger P. Christensen, -0648
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
Attorney for Black and Decker
510 Clark Learning Building
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-3431
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
OL EVE LOOMIS DAVIS,
Plaintiff,

)
)

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
BLACK AND DECKER (U.S.)/ INC.,
(a Maryland corporation
authorized to do business in
the State of Utah, and a subsidiary of Black and Decker
Corporation, Inc. and BLACK and
DECKER CORPORATION, INC., (a
Maryland corporation,
Defendants.

]
Civil No. 89-0907651 CV
]I
]
J
;
J

Judge Moffat

]

Defendant Black & Decker hereby submits the following
Memorandum in support of his motion for summary judgment.
INTRODUCTION
This is a rather unusual and somewhat bizarre products
liability

personal

injury

action,

one

in

which

Plaintiff

essentially claims that chemicals from her Black & Decker Classic
metal

steam

iron caused

her to have

"contact

dermatitis11

for

several years; that she was unable to tolerate any fabric touching
her skin and was forced to spend at least half of each day naked.
Plaintiff claims that the defendants Black & Decker, Inc. and Black
& Decker Corporation, Inc. ("Black & Decker11) designed and marketed

the allegedly defective iron and are therefore responsible for what
she perceives to be severe and permanent injuries.

Plaintiff's

alleged injuries specifically include "unsightly skin, sensitivity
to all fabrics, physical and mental pain and suffering, long term
medical

treatment

and

monitoring,

and

a

life

long

fear

and

apprehension induced by her knowledge of the long term consequences
of such treatment, namely osteoporosis and a shortened life span
brought about by the use of corticosteriods prescribed for her
symptoms."

Plaintiff's amended complaint, para. 20, p. 9.
It is the Black & Decker's position that its iron was not

responsible for Plaintiff's injuries.

First, Plaintiff suffered

identical dermatological problems four years prior to purchasing
the iron.

Additionally, this case is so far-fetched that even

though Plaintiff has been to multiple doctors, she cannot find one
who will substantiate her claims.

As this case presents highly

technical questions of medicine and chemistry, Plaintiff must have
a

competent

connection

and

qualified

between

the

expert

iron and

witness

to

Plaintiff's

show
alleged

the

causal

injuries.

Plaintiff has no such expert, while Dr. Swinyer (who did an IME, on
plaintiff) and Dr. Zone (plaintiff's own doctor), have expressed
their expert opinions that plaintiffs' skin problems were not
caused by the iron.

Accordingly, Black & Decker is entitled to

summary judgment as a matter of law.
FACTS
1.

On December 17, 1987, Plaintiff purchased a Black &
2

-5U1~-

Decker Classic metal iron.

(Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, para.

7.)
2.

Plaintiff alleges that when she cleaned the iron

prior to using it, it emitted toxic fumes.

Furthermore, Plaintiff

insists that the toxic fumes not only caused her to^have a panic
attack

but

also

contaminated

her

skin.

(Plaintiff's

Amended

Complaint, paras. 5, 9a and 9b; Deposition of 01 Eve Loomis Davis,
pp. 25-26.)
3.

Plaintiff also alleges that the iron contained toxic

chemical residues that were pressed into her clothing, further
contaminating her skin. (Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, para. 9c.)
4.

Plaintiff maintains that as a result of her contact

with the iron, all fabrics that touch her skin cause her to have
reactions.

(Deposition of 01 Eve Loomis Davis, p. 65.)
5.

Plaintiff also claims that she is forced to spend at

least one half of everyday naked because the iron has made it
impossible for her to wear most clothing.

(Deposition of 01 Eve

Loomis Davis, p. 65.)
6.

Plaintiff claims to have continued to use the iron

for approximately

two and one half years, despite her claimed

belief that the chemicals from the iron were causing her skin
condition.

(Deposition of 01 Eve Loomis Davis, p. 47.)
7.

On February 5, 1988, plaintiff began seeing Dr. Leo

Sotiriou, a physician who had been practicing as a dermatologist
for

ten

years.

(Deposition

of
3

Dr.

Leo

Sotiriou,

pp.

4-6;

Deposition of 01 Eve Loomis Davis, p. 67.)
8.

Dr.

Sotiriou

diagnosed

contact

dermatitis

with

possible atopic eczema and strongly recommended that plaintiff
undergo patch testing.

(Deposition of Dr. Leo Sotiriou, pp. 13,

18-19.)
9.

Dr. Sotiriou understands that plaintiff has not

followed his recommendation to receive the patch testing, despite
the fact that at least two other doctors have also recommended
patch testing. (Deposition of Dr. Leo Sotiriou, p. 19)
10.

Dr. Sotiriou has stated that he has not found any

medical authority to support plaintiff's claims that the Black &
Decker iron caused her problems. Consequently, Dr. Sotiriou is not
willing to state that the iron was responsible for her alleged
injuries.

(Deposition of Dr. Leo Sotiriou, pp. 19-22.)
11.

On July 10, 1989, Plaintiff went to Dr. Kristin M.

Leiferman at the Mayo Clinic.

Dr. Leiferman recommended

that

Plaintiff enter the hospital for further treatment and continued
evaluation.

Plaintiff did not follow Dr. Leiferman's advice and

did not return to the Mayo Clinic. (Deposition of Dr. John Joseph
Zone, exhibit 5, letter from Dr. Kristin M. Leiferman.)
12.

On September 6, 1989, Plaintiff saw Dr. John Joseph

Zone, the Chief of the Division of Dermatology at the University of
Utah Medical Center. (Deposition of Dr. John Joseph Zone, pp. 3,4.)
13.

While reviewing Plaintiff's medical records, Dr.

Zone discovered

that Plaintiff had been treated
4

3</t

for

identical

contact dermatitis by Dr. Don Reese at the University of Utah
Medical Center on October 19, 1983, four years prior to purchasing
the Black & Decker iron.

Dr. Zone also discovered that Dr. Reese

had scheduled Plaintiff for patch testing on November 9, 1983.
Plaintiff did not keep that appointment.

(Deposition of Dr. John

Joseph Zone, pp. 11-24 and exhibits 8-9.)
14.
testing

and

Dr. Zone recommended that Plaintiff receive patch
scheduled

September 13, 1989.

Plaintiff

for

another

appointment

on

Plaintiff neither returned for her scheduled

appointment nor got the recommended patch testing.

(Deposition of

Dr. John Joseph Zone, pp. 26-28.)
15.

When

asked

if he had

an opinion

as to whether

Plaintiff's problems were related to the Black & Decker iron, Dr.
Zone stated

his

"tendency was to say that

injuries] were not related."

[the

iron and the

(Deposition of Dr. John Joseph Zone,

p. 8.)
16.

On February 5, 1991, Plaintiff was scheduled to see

Dr. Frances Storrs at Oregon State University Health Sciences in
Portland,

Oregon.

dermatitis.

Dr.

Storrs

is

a

specialist

in

contact

The medical evidence indicates that Plaintiff did not

keep that appointment.

(Deposition of 01 Eve Loomis Davis, pp. 70-

71.)
17.

On October 2, 1991, Defendant asked the court to

order Plaintiff to submit to an independent medical examination as
Plaintiff had placed her medical condition in issue and had refused
5

to

submit

to

an

independent

Defendant's request.

medical

evaluation

pursuant

to

(See "Motion for Medical Examination Pursuant

to Rule 35" dated October 2, 1991.)
18.

On

October

11,

1991,

Plaintiff

objected

to

Defendant's motion for an independent medical examination. (See
"Plaintiff's

objection

to

Defendant's

Motion

for

Medical

Examination Pursuant to Rule 35" dated October 11, 1991.)
19.

On November 8, 1991, the court reviewed the motions

and memorandum and ordered Plaintiff to submit to an independent
medical examination.
20.
Leonard

J.

On February 25, 1992, Plaintiff was seen by Dr.

Swinyer

examination.

(See "Order" dated November 20, 1991.)

for the

court

ordered

independent

medical

Dr. Swinyer is a board certified dermatologist and is

considered one of the leading experts in contact dermatitis and
contact eczema in Salt Lake City.

(Affidavit of Dr. Leonard J.

Swinyer, paras. 1-3.)
21.

Dr. Swinyer reviewed Plaintiff's medical records,

photographs provided by Plaintiff, the depositions of Plaintiff,
Dr. Zone and Dr. Sotiriou, and a personal medical history written
by Plaintiff.
22.

(Affidavit of Dr. Leonard J. Swinyer, para. 5.)
Dr. Swinyer conducted a thorough examination, and

determined that Plaintiff's skin was "clear and free of any of the
skin conditions."

Plaintiff told Dr. Swinyer that her skin had

been clear since June or July of 1991.
J. Swinyer, paras. 6-7.)
6

(Affidavit of Dr. Leonard

23.

Based

on

his

professional

experience,

his

examination of Plaintiff, and the available medical, personal and
legal

records,

Dr.

Swinyer

expressed

the

opinion

that

"[Plaintiff's] skin conditions were not the result of chemicals or
chemical

compounds

emitted

from

the

Black

&

Decker

iron."

(Affidavit of Dr. Leonard J. Swinyer, para. 8.)
24.

Dr. Swinyer also indicated that Plaintiff's "pre-

existing contact eczema and/or pre-existing contact dermatitis may
have been produced by formaldehyde resin commonly found in some
fabrics used in women's clothing."

(Affidavit of Dr. Leonard J.

Swinyer, para. 10.)
ARGUMENT
PLAINTIFF DOES NOT MAKE A PRIME FACIE CASE
AGAINST BLACK & DECKER FOR NEGLIGENCE,
STRICT LIABILITY OR BREACH OF WARRANTY BECAUSE
PLAINTIFF DOES NOT HAVE AN EXPERT WITNESS
Because this case is rather peculiar and presents highly
technical questions of medicine and chemistry that are beyond the
sphere of the ordinary juror, the plaintiff is obligated to provide
an expert witness who can establish causation.
this requirement are firmly established.

The reasons for

First, defendant should

not be required to respond for damages to compensate a victim where
there is no known scientific basis for her claims and where those
who are knowledgeable do not support her contentions. Furthermore,
courts have instituted this requirement in certain negligence and
strict liability cases, such as those involving complex medical
7

issues, because juries need sound foundations for their decisions.
Juries

cannot

be

allowed

to

speculate

consideration to facts and qualified
otherwise would

and

must

limit

their

expert testimony.

To do

invite juries to base decisions on conjecture,

sympathy, and passion.

Accordingly, the vast majority of courts

hold that the plaintiff must have competent, qualified

expert

testimony when medical issues are involved.
Many courts extend the expert requirement to actions
against any professionals such as engineers, architects, doctors
and lawyers, holding that the plaintiff is obligated to establish
the standard of care applicable to that profession and, through
expert testimony, to establish that the defendant's actions fell
below

that

standard

of

care.

See,

e.g.,

Hoopiianina

v.

Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 270 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)
(in medical malpractice action, expert medical testimony required
to establish causation); Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d
1980)

(majority

of

medical

malpractice

cases

348 (Utah

require

expert

testimony); Nauman v. Harold K. Beacher & Associates, 467 P.2d 610
(Utah 1970) (breach of a standard of care for architects requires
expert testimony).
Likewise,
consistently

in

required

strict

liability

actions,

courts

have

that plaintiff prove the existence of a

defect, the unreasonably dangerous aspect of the product, and the
causative
witnesses.

nexus

to

plaintiff's

injuries

by

means

of

expert

See Fane v. Zimmer, Inc., 927 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1991);
8

Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. , 721 F. Supp. 89 (D. Md. 1989) ;
Aarnes v. Merck & Co., 532 F. Supp. 148 (D.N.J. 1980).
This rule clearly applies to the instant case.

In this

case, none of Plaintiff's treating physicians have concluded that
Plaintiff's skin condition is caused by the Black & Decker iron.
In addition, Plaintiff has not presented any other medical experts
who

will

verify

her

claim

that

the

responsible for her alleged injuries.
pending

for

twenty-seven

months,

Black

&

Decker

iron

is

Indeed, this case has been

and

although

Plaintiff

has

suspected the iron since December 17, 1987, and although she has
seen four expert dermatologists, she has no medical expert to
support her case.

This alone should be fatal to her case.

Not only does Plaintiff not have an expert, but Defendant
can

provide

an

expert

who

has

examined

Plaintiff

and

conclusively testify that her allegations are unfounded.
Affidavit

of

Dr.

Swinyer.)

Thus,

because

Plaintiff

has

will
(See
not

supplied expert testimony to support her claims, she has not made
a prima facie case against Black & Decker and therefore Black &
Decker is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Under the circumstances of this case, the case law is
clear that plaintiff is obligated to present expert testimony.

For

example, in Fane v. Zimmer, Inc. , 927 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1991),
plaintiff brought an action against the manufacturer of an fixation
device that had been inserted in her hip to aid in healing after a
fracture.

Plaintiff asserted claims of negligent failure to warn
9

and strict liability for design defect.
directed

verdict

plaintiff had

in

favor

of

the

The trial court granted a

manufacturer

stating

that

failed to prove causation because plaintiff had

presented no expert medical testimony.

Id. at 131.

In affirming

the trial court, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
M

[t]he
issue
of
causation
in
such
a
complicated medical case, therefore, was one
beyond the sphere of the ordinary juryman and
required expert testimony. . . . Absent
competent medical expert testimony on the
issue of causation the [plaintiff] could not
prove the elements of a cause of action based
in strict products liability or negligence.
Id.
Similarly, in Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 721 F.
Supp.

89

(D. Md.

1989) , plaintiff

brought

suit

against

the

manufacturer of a breast implant prosthesis, alleging negligence,
strict liability, and breach of warranty when the implant ruptured
requiring surgical intervention.

The manufacturer moved for, and

was granted, summary judgment. After ruling that plaintiff had not
identified

the

prosthesis,

defendant

and that

she

as the

manufacturer

of the

ruptured

failed

to establish

the elements of

failure to warn, the court then directed its attention to the fact
that plaintiff had not presented any expert testimony to support
her allegations stating:
In order to prove her claims of negligence,
strict liability, and breach of warranty,
plaintiff must produce evidence that the
implants were defective and that the defect
was the proximate cause of her injury.
The
testimony
of
an
expert
witness
is
10

wo

indispensable in product liability cases when
the
subject
of
the
inference
is
so
particularly related to some science or
profession that it is beyond the ken of the
average layman.
Lee, 721 F. Supp. at 95 (quoting Virgil v. nKash N / Karrv" Service
Corp., 484 A.2d 652 (Md. Ct. App. 1984) (emphasis added).

The Lee

court further observed:
The interaction of a breast prothesis with the
human
body
raised
technical
questions
requiring expert testimony. . . .
In the
absence of expert testimony, the evidence does
not permit an inference that the leak was
caused by a defect.
It is insufficient to
rely merely on the occurrence of the rupture
to show a defect.
Proof of a defect in a
products liability case must rise above
speculation and recovery cannot be predicated
on a presumption from the mere happening of an
accident.
Id. at 96 (emphasis added).
Expert testimony is likewise needed in the case at hand.
The

interaction

between

the

iron

complex medical and chemical issues.
expect

the

average

juror

to

and

plaintiff's

skin

raises

It is highly unreasonable to

understand

and

appreciate

the

complexities of the plaintiff's medical condition without guidance
from a dermatologist.

It is equally unreasonable to expect the

average juror to make the connection between the iron and the
plaintiff's alleged injuries without the expertise of a physician
who can explain causation.

In sum,

it is impossible

for the

average juror to have any appreciation or understanding of this
area of medicine without competent explanations from those who so
11

311

understand.
speculate
injury.

on

Furthermore, the plaintiff cannot ask a jury simply to
causation

because

she

alleges

that

she

suffered

She must present qualified and competent expert testimony

to support her claims.
CONCLUSION
Black & Decker can provide an expert dermatologist who
will state that the Black & Decker iron was not the cause of
plaintiff's

injuries.

In

addition,

plaintiff's

own

treating

physicians are unwilling to connect the plaintiff's injuries to her
Black and Decker Iron.

The plaintiff, on the other hand, has

provided no experts supporting her position.

In view of the fact

that without an expert plaintiff cannot make a prima facie case
against Black & Decker, Black and Decker is entitled to summary
judgment.

^ /A
DATED this

"day of
CHRISTE^SEtff,

JENSE

/ K o g e r / P . WMci&zerrsen
A t t o r n e y s / f o r Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that a copy of Defendant's Memorandum
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment has been mailed, postage
prepaid, addressed to the following this
(UJ'/MNTL

/>- '

, 1992:

j

Elmer T. Davis, Jr.
1181 Chandler Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103

i
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31?

day of

Roger P. Christensen, #0648
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
Attorney for Black and Decker
510 Clark Learning Building
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-3431
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
OL EVE LOOMIS DAVIS,
AFFIDAVIT OF
LEONARD J. SWINYER, M.D.

Plaintiff,
vs.
BLACK AND DECKER (U.S.), INC.,
(a Maryland corporation
authorized to do business in
the State of Utah, and a subsidiary of Black and Decker
Corporation, Inc. and BLACK and
DECKER CORPORATION, INC., (a
Maryland corporation,

Civil No. 89-0907651 CV
Judge Moffatt

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

:

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE :
I, Leonard J. Swinyer, M.D., being first duly sworn upon
oath, do hereby testify as follows:
1.

I am a medical doctor specializing in dermatology,

currently engaged in the private practice of medicine in Salt Lake
City, Utah.
2.
dermatopathology.

I

am

board

certified

in

dermatology

and

I have been a licensed physician since 1966 and
-1-
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board certified in Dermatology since 1973.
3. Contact dermatitis and contact eczema have been areas
of emphasis in my practice and I am generally considered as one of
the leading experts in Salt Lake City in those areas.
4.

I was

retained

as a dermatology

expert by the

attorneys representing Black & Decker in the above case to conduct
a

dermatology

analysis

and

examination

plaintiff, 01 Eve Loomis Davis.

with

respect

to

the

I saw Mrs. Davis in my office on

February 25, 1992.
5.
photographs

As

part

provided

dermatological

of

in

my

analysis

this

case

at

issue

conditions

by
in

I

have

the

reviewed

plaintiff

this

case.

of
I

the
the
also

interviewed Mrs. Davis, reviewed her deposition and reviewed the
written medical history she provided.

I have also reviewed the

following medical records and materials:
a.

Records of Dr. Leo Sotiriou;

b.

Records of the University of Utah Dermatology

Clinic, Dr. John Zone;
c.

Records

of

the

University

of

Utah

OB/GYN

Department;
d.

Records of the Ear, Nose and Throat Center of

Salt Lake City, Dr. Glen K. Lund;
e.
6.

The depositions of Drs. Sotiriou and Zone.

Based

on

my

own

examination,

as

well

as

the

statements of Mrs. Davis and the information she provided, it was
-2-

apparent to me that on the date of the examination, (February 25,
1992) , Mrs. Davis' skin was clear and free of any of the skin
conditions which Mrs. Davis describes in her deposition and/or
which are depicted in the photographs which she has provided.
7.

Mrs. Davis informed me that her skin became clear

last June or July, spontaneously, and has remained clear since. It
is

my

understanding

that

she

is

not

currently

taking

any

medications for contact dermatitis or contact eczema, and that she
was not taking such medications since her skin cleared.
8.
and

interview

Based on my training and experience, my examination
of

Mrs.

Davis, my

review

of

the

photographs,

depositions and medical records and the other information I have
been provided, as well as my professional

judgment, it is my

opinion that Mrs. Davis' skin conditions, (which she has described
and as depicted in the photographs which she supplied) , were not
the result of chemicals or chemical compounds emitted from the
Black & Decker iron which she describes in her deposition.
9.

It

is

apparent

from

the

medical

records

and

depositions that Mrs. Davis had contact eczema and/or contact
dermatitis prior to 1987, which is when she has stated that she
purchased the Black & Decker iron.
10.

Based on the information which has been provided to

me, I believe that her pre-existing contact eczema and/or contact
dermatitis may have been produced by formaldehyde resins commonly
found in some fabrics used in women's clothing.
-3-

DATED this

H

day of J*pfXiQ 1992.

'/

CfWlb^'
Leonard J. &yinyer, (fi/D/
T^iYfi''
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
Ap*il7 1992.

U- •

x

u^un

fr

.

>>AU

Notary Public^ y
Residing at: V ^ 0¥ L,CT
My commission expires: \b~ i^tfh

::
"

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

day of

f

'- <;_GT ' •_.-•.>'?
day of April, 1992, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Leonard J.
Swinyer, M.D. was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid to:
Elmer Thomas Davis, Jr.
Attorney for Plaintiff
1181 Chandler Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
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GRANTS DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR MEDICAL EXAMINATION.
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STATE OF UTAH,
DATE:
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

OL EVE LOOMIS DAVIS,

:

MINUTE ENTRY

:

Case No.

vs.

:

JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT

BLACK AND DECKER, et al.,

:

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

The
Order

Court

:

having

Compelling

Interrogatories,
Compliance

890907651 CV

with

considered

More

the
the

the

Complete

plaintiff's
Court's

plaintiff's
Answers

Objection

November

to

20,

Objection

to

to

Plaintiff's

the

Defendant's

1992

Order,

the

defendant's Motions for Sanctions for Discovery Abuse and all
the memoranda in response and in support of the various motions
above

described

and

now

being

fully

advised

in the

premises

makes this its:
MINUTE ENTRY
After a thorough review of all of the pending matters as

DAVIS V. BLACK & DECKER

PAGE 2

MINUTE ENTRY

above recited the Court is of the opinion that the plaintiff is
simply attempting to revisit and reopen matters which the Court
has already ruled upon and to which objections have been made
and the Court has ruled on the objections.
opinion

that

the

defendant's

The Court is of the

compliance

with

the

Court's

November 20, 1991 Order was in good faith and complete to the
extent

it

could

plaintiff's

be.

The

Court

characterization

of

being inacurate or nonverifiable.

does

the

not

agree

defendant's

with

the

discovery

as

The response, informal though

it may have been, to the last Court's Order by written letter
rather

than

formal

sufficient.

filing

However,

the

those answers as contained

of

Court

answers,
will

should

order

and

have

been

require

that

in that correspondence be put

into

proper form and filed in response to the request for discovery.
The history
forth

by

the

of discovery

defendant

in

in this
it's

case

response

is exactly
to

the

as

set

plaintiff's

memorandum and does warrant the imposition of sanctions on the
plaintiff.

For some reason the plaintiff has some difficulty in

understanding the extent and nature to which discovery must be
responded.

Parties are not required to do the legal work for

other parties nor are they required to seek out information that
can

just

discovery.

as

easily
The

be

Court

obtained
therefore

by

the party

imposes

upon

asking
the

for

the

plaintiff's

DAVIS V. BLACK & DECKER

Counsel

a

sanction

PAGE 3

in

the

sum

of

MINUTE ENTRY

$500.00

to

be

paid

by

plaintiff's Counsel to Counsel for the defendant representing
extra cost incurred in the way of attorneys fees and expenses in
the discovery
meritless

occasioned by reason of

discovery.

The

current

frivilous and clearly

pending

motions

filed

by

plaintiff are further evidence of that very fact.
Counsel for the defendant will prepare an appropriate order.
DATED this

day of July, £#92

I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AN
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THIRD
DISTRICT COURT. SALT LAKE COUNTY.

STATEOFUTAH/7:

^/^^J^

JLERK
RTCLEI

DAVIS V. BLACK & DECKER

PAGE 4

MINUTE ENTRY

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following,

. no-

this

I

day of July, 1992:

Elmer T. Davis, Jr.
Attorney for Plaintiff
1181 Chandler Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Roger P. Christensen
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
Attorney for Defendant
510 Clark Learning Building
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

SW^TJ^M

>^2J^—
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25
So I just sat it by the sink and I had a plug there to do
that phase of it.
So after it was turned on, and it was heating
up, then I busied myself just to the right where the
dishwasher was.
Q

And I was unloading the dishwasher.

So this is sitting on the kitchen counter

heating up while you're working on the dishwasher.
A

Yes.

And it f s right there close.

In other

words, my arm could reach to the iron, and this arm, my
right arm, can reach to the dishwasher.

I mean, that was

the proximity of the iron to me.
Q

When do you recall first noticing a smell coming

from the iron as it heated up?
A

It was quite soon after I plugged it in.

was very sudden and very intense.

And it

And it just sort of all

at once I kind of was shocked, and it kind of enveloped
me, and it all just hit at once.

I smelled the fumes, I

had this intense flash of fear and panic, and it was
really quite scary for me.

And my heart, I don't know

which came first, I think the fear and panic, or it was
all simultaneous.

It was all so suddenly at the one

moment, that who could say what came first.
But then my heart beat very erratically, and I
was very conscious of it being fast and erratically.
at the same time the fear and panic.

And

And it just hit me

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT
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just suddenly when the fumes, when I smelled the fumes.
And it was very soon after the iron was heated up.
Q

Can you give me some idea of how soon?

Are we

talking a half a minute, several minutes?
A

No, I can't say that.

Because if I had had that

iron longer I would have known how long it takes for it to
heat up.

But at that time, let me think now —

don f t know.

I really

Because when you're ironing clothes it takes

a while to get to the complete temperature, but it will
still be hot halfway through.
I had it on seven.

All right, the fumes

could start coming out long before it hit that seven
temperature.

So I don't think there's any way I could say

at what point that the fumes started coming out.

Whether

it had hit that seven temperature or not, or whether it
was on five or something else.
Q

Now, you obviously could smell these fumes.

A

Obviously.

was.

It was very, very scary, it really

It just was scary.
Q

Can you give us any help at all in understanding

what they smelled like?
A

Now, these chemicals —

I've never been around

working with a lot of chemicals, especially those being
heated up, so I don't know that I could possibly say.
Because these chemicals were -h-e-a-fe-sd up, they were coming

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT
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out in the fumes, and I just don't think I would have had
any —

I can't think of anything in my experience where I

would have been in a situation like that where I could
smell them and identify them.
Q

I'm not asking you tell me what they were.

A

No, no,

I didn't say that.

I said these

chemicals were being heated, which many times I would
think, I would think it would anyway, would give chemicals
a different odor or —

I don't know.

It's just the fact

that I don't remember smelling those chemicals before.
Q

What I want —

A

It was very strange for me anyway.

Q

What I'm looking for is was it a damp, musty

smell, whether it's a —
A

No, musty —

Q

Whether it's an electrical smell.

A

It smelled like weird chemicals.

d:

jinusty —

Musty, no.

Is

it didn't smell musty, I can probably say that.
I just don't think if I were interviewed —

I

just haven't been around chemicals enough, see, to know.
Q

To you it had a chemical type smell to it?

A

Yes.

It's a chemical smell, it's not like

—

it didn't have a rotten egg smell, some chemicals do have
that smell I guess.

It just had a weird chemical odor

that was very noxious.

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT
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seconds.
Q

Did you start ironing about then, or did you

wait till

—

A

I waited the whole time.

stickler for directions.

As I said, I'm a

I let it heat up, even though it

was some hot I let it heat up.
Q

Is there a feature on the iron that tells you

when it's hit the set temperature?

Is there a light or

something?
A
don't —
—

No.

That one doesn't have that feature.

no, I don't think it does.

I sure

As I say, it's been

I quit using that iron about, I'd have to check that, a

few months ago.

I stopped using that iron after I found

out that there were sealants inside of the water —
steam chamber.

I didn't know that before that.

of the

I just

continued using that iron for that whole two-and-a-half,
over two years anyway, two-and-a-half years.
I can't figure the exact time on that.
out —

I forget.

But after I found

I know I'd used it at least two-and-a-half years.
After I found out that it had sealants in it and

I quit using it, evidently I just kept ironing them into
my clothes.
Q

Okay.

A

I thought the initial exposure, see, at first is

what did it.

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT
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around —

it was sometime in the morning is all I know on

that, the 17th.

I don't even know I can swear to that.

It was on the day of the 17th,

Sometime that day that's

when I ironed my first pink blouse.
And then the next day I ironed another, the next
day another, the next day another.

There's four blouses.

And then on the fifth morning, I had worn all four blouses
about 40 hours that week, allowing for the time that I had
to do my writing and my work through the house.

So on the

fifth morning I didn't have any more clean blouses to
wear.

But that morning my skin was very reacting, and I

couldn't even stand my cotton gown on that I'd worn for
years, next to my skin.
And from that day till now no fabric can touch
my skin without a reaction.

It's in varying degrees,

depends upon what it is, whether it's rayon or linen.
I've tried everything, I've run the gamut on clothes.
have dressmakers make up special clothes.
difference unless I'm naked.

I

It makes no

And I go around the house,

believe it or not, naked a tremendous amount of the time,
at least half of every day.

The other half I wear a very

loose kind of a night gown thing that's so full from the
shoulders that it hardly touches my skin.
I wear.

And that's what

And that's what I live in.
If I go out anywhere, like today, before —

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT
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1

Q

2

A

T cell what?

T

cell lymphoma.

It's a cancer that's virtually

3

always fatal.

4

I'd had it, even at that time I'd had the contact

5

dermatitis quite a while.

6

worry about with contact dermatitis.

7

And she thought that's what I had, because

And it's one of the things you

But she did a very, very extensive lab tests and

8

she took biopsies of the eruptions on my skin, and it all

9

came back normal, all my blood, everything.

10
11

deficiencies, none of that.

No immune

Everything was absolutely

normal.

12

And an interesting thing, they put a hospital

13

gown on me, a cotton hospital gown, and while she was

14

standing there, you know, talking to me and that whole

15

bit, I'd been in the gown probably 15 minutes, and while

16

she was standing there talking to me I started breaking

17

out from the hospital gown.

18

firsthand information for her.

19

reacted to fabric.

And so that was kind of a
It showed her how I

20

Q

Are you still under her care?

21

A

No.

Dr. Sotiriou and I have been looking for a

22

doctor that's a contact dermatitis specialist, and believe

23

me, they're difficult to find.

We finally found one.

24

Q

And who is that?

25

A

It's a Dr. Frances Storrs, S-T-O-R-R-S, at the

71
1

Oregon State University Health Sciences, Portland, Oregon.

2

And I have an appointment on 5 February.

3

to bring every blouse, she says if it takes two duffle

4

bags you bring them.

5

And they want me

Every blouse, every fabric that I

I have reacted to.

6

Q

So you're going there on February 5?

7

A

Five, yes.

And I'll be there, they're going

—

8

now, here is the thing, I've been trying for over three

9

years to get the names of the chemicals in the iron so I

10

could avoid them in the environment.

11

material companies and clothing companies and find out

12

what residues remain in the fabric, so I could avoid

13

contamination.

14

information until I called up Cigna and talked to Heidi

15

Ambrosia, I think that was over a year, they had —

16

had responded or hardly said anything to me for a whole

17

year.

18

the chemicals.

19

You can write to the

But Black & Decker would not give me that

nobody

I kept waiting for somebody to give me the name of

I called her up one day, I had been going all

20

day stark naked in the house.

21

I was sitting on the edge of the bed and I was crying, and

22

I told her that I had to have the name of those chemicals.

23

I was broken out horribly.

Well, she was fairly sympathetic.

24

I'd run into that —

25

interested.

First person

in the company nobody else seemed

She said, "All right, I'm going to call the
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A

In pharmacy.

Q

What is the difference?

A

Pharmacology deals directly with the drugs,

pharmacy is dealing in cells, and so forth, more so than
just straight pharmacology.
Q

How long have you been practicing as a

dermatologist?
A

I have been practicing for ten years.

Q

It is my understanding that at some point in time

you began treating the plaintiff in this case, Mrs. 01 Eve
Davis; is that true?
A

Yes.

Q

If you could just give me a minute I think I can

expedite this.
A

Okay.

Q

I assume, Doctor, you have had occasion of having

your deposition taken before?
A

In medical cases, no.

Q

Have you had it taken in any other context?

A

In other things, yes.

Q

Do you feel like you are at least generally

familiar with what a deposition is and the procedure?
A

Yes, I do.
(Exhibit A marked for identification.)

Q

(By Mr. Christensen)

Doctor, I have previously

1

Q

2

same time.

3

A

Okay.

4

Q

Would you just very briefly go through now each of

Yes.

And I'm going to number my own copy at the

Fourteen pages.

5

these pages we have numbered 1 through 14 and describe for

6

the record what each page is.

7

A

Okay.

Page 1.

I saw Mrs. Davis on February 5 of

8

1988, and when I see patients, I usually dictate my notes

9

after I have seen the patient.

Page 1 deals with the times

10

that I have seen the patient, February 5th of 1988 through

11

June 24th of 1988, and it also includes any communications

12

on the phone.

13

Q

Okay.

14

A

Page 2 is the same thing.

15

Q

All right.

16

A

And page 3 is the same thing, and my last visit

17

with Mrs. Davis was 4-20-90.

18

patient that comes in to my office fills out a patient

19

information form and it just gives me generally the history

20

of where they live, allergies, and so forth, which is page 4

2"

and 5.

22

Q

23

The next page, page 4, each

I notice after the typewritten portion of page 5

there are several handwritten notes.

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

Can you tell us whether those are your

6

chemicals in a steam iron," and also in the back she said
she had tried Mycostarin and Triamcinolone, which, one is an
antifungal and one is a cortisone, and she said that they
made her skin worse, that she is allergic to amoxicillin and
various other things.

Maybe she told me when she was

speaking to me other things but I didn't write them down,
Q

As far as your objective findings, you noted, and

I can't say that first o n e —
A

Eczematized, weeping areas behind the ears, face,

back and chest,
Q

What does that mean?

A

The skin was very irritated and it was weeping, it

was like a fluid coming, usually serum.
Q

And this was in areas behind the ears, and her

face, back and chest?
A

Yes.

Q

And your assessment was contact dermatitis with

possible atopic eczema?
A

Right.

Q

What is atopic eczema?

A

Atopic eczema is a problem where people, usually

if you look in the books, it is kind of controversial, but
it can be hereditary allergies.

Many children will have

atopic eczema and as they get older they will continue to
have allergies, hay fever, and react to different things.

13

have problems with wool.

Some people will say that they can

have problems with polyester resins, and so forth, although,
you know, again, in Fisher, which is a book on contact
dermatitis, he feels that as a rule it is not a dermatology
hazard, so I guess it is hard to say.
yes or no.

You know, I can't say

There are certain things that wool can cause

problems for some people and I guess certain materials.
Q

There is a book by a doctor named Fisher?

A

Fisher is his name.

on contact dermatitis.
Q

He is probably the authority

Alexander Fisher.

And you can get that at the medical library up at

the "U"?
A

I'm sure you can.

Q

You, apparently, from the note I saw on page 4 of

Exhibit A, which is the patient information sheet.
A

Yes.

Q

Were told at the first visit that Mrs. Davis felt

that she had reacted to chemicals in a new steam iron?
A

Yes.

Q

Do you recall what she told you in that regard?

A

You know, I don't recall.

My note doesn't say

anything about that, although it is in the written sheet by
the patient, and it is just, "Skin reacted violently to
chemicals in new steam iron (buffering material inside of
iron)".

And I don't recall anything else other than the

15

note tnat I put down.
Q

Would you normally review this information sheet

as part of the first visit?
A

Yes, I look at it, but I have, you know,

apparenrly I didn't pay a great significance to that.
Q

Do you recall in the course of your treatment of

Mrs. Davis from February of 1988 until you last saw her,
which was in 1990.
A

Yes, April 20th of 1990, I saw her last.

Q

April 20th of 1990?

A

Yes.

Q

Do you recall that subject coming up?

A

The steam iron?

Q

Yes.

A

You know, no, I don / t recall.

my notes about this steam iron.
didn't say it to me.

I have no where in

It doesn't mean that she

I just never put it down if she did.

It was difficult in a sense.

I get a lot of communication

from Mrs. Davis that she is allergic to a lot of things.
You know, I wanted her referred off, and she went to the
Mayo Clinic, she saw doctors at the Mayo Clinic.

They

wanted her to come back and she didn't want to go back.

I

sent her to Dr. Zone, and he wanted her to come, and she
didn't necessarily want to go back.

She was going to go and

see Dr. Store, who would be a good person to see, because he

16

is pretty well-known for contact dermatitis, and apparently
I mailed the records up there, and 1 guess that hasn't been
done yet.
Q

He is a doctor in Portland?

A

In Oregon, yes.

But she needed patch testing all j
i

the way along and it hasn't really been done yet at this

j

point.

!

Q

I assume that as part of your treatment of her you '

!

i

made a diagnosis as to her problem?

!

A

In my opinion, sure.

Q

Would that be the assessment that we see?

:

A

Yes, that is the assessment, yes, contact

•

dermatitis.
Q

Did your assessment of that problem change during

the period that you were seeing her?
A

No, I thought she always had a contact dermatitis. :
i
i

I thought possibly an underlying chronic allergy, and atopic j
eczema in general.

Although a letter that I did receive

i

j

from the Mayo Clinic talked about the possibility of Sezary !
i
t

syndrome.

Many people will have chronic problems like this |

and then evolve into a lymphoma type problem, which is like j
a cancer, and they can just sit and smolder like this for a !
good long time before this other problem occurs.

j

Q

What does that mean?

j

A

It is a pre-malignant problem and many times it is i

a precursor to a person going into cancer, a lymphoma.

It

is mycosis fungoides, and that is a lymphoma, and sometimes
people have this chronic problem and all of a sudden it will
involve into this lymphoma problem.

It is difficult to

diagnose.
Q

I assume as part of your work as a dermatologist,

you try to determine what is causing the problems so that
you can deal with it; is that a fair assessment or not?
A

It is a fair assessment, in the sense that you can

see, yes, it is a contact dermatitis, but many times you
can't specifically pin it onto something without doing
further tests, like patch tests, and so forth, which I used
to do but I don't do any more.
Q

The patch test is where you put various agents on

someone's skin and see which ones they react to?
A

Sure.

Q

And which ones they don't?

A

Sure.

And the reason we don't do it as much any

more is because there are so many agents and they have come
out with a new patch test kit which is very expensive.

If

you don't do a lot of patch testing, it is not worth doing
it, so that's why you have people like Dr. Zone, or this Dr.
Store, who has massive patch testing abilities do this type
of test for you.
Q

And that is something that has been recommended

18

for Mrs. Davis?
A

Yes,

Q

But she has not yet had it?

A

That is my understanding, yes.

Q

And why is that sort of testing done?

A

It helps to find out if you are reacting to

something or allergic to something.
the cause of it.

It can help take away

I mean if you are allergic to

preservatives that are found in lotions, you keep away from
those lotions.

You do that to find out what may be causing

the rash.
Q

Have you, as part of the work that you have done

with her, formed at least a preliminary opinion as to
whether or not the Black and Decker iron has caused her
problems?
A

You know, I can't say that it has or it hasn't.

just cannot say.

I have never r e a d —

I

I have tried to find

out if there is any possibility of the Black and Decker
steam iron causing the problem.
in my medical journals.

I have never read anything

I'm not saying that it is not

possible but I have never seen anything in the medical
journals that says that that is a possibility.
Q

You have never seen it or been able to find any

medical authority?
A

Right, I haven't.
19

involves chemicals that are within that iron, and unless
they know what those chemicals are, they can't make a
decision that it is not the fault." It is the fact that your
defendants have not provided the information.

Now, our last

interrogatories asked for the information and that is due on
the 28th.

I notice my letter said the 25th but it is really

the 28th.
Q

(By Mr. Christensen)

You need to understand,

Doctor, that he periodically will make objections to make a
record.
A

Okay.

Q

Obviously, we don't have a judge here to rule on

such things.
A

Right.

Q

So he is making a record.

you don't answer the questions.
the Court later if we need to.

That doesn't mean that

We will deal with that with
Do you n e e d —

A

I think I remember the question.

Q

You were starting to answer that while you allow

for the possibility that the iron played some role, both
you, and from your discussions with Dr. Zone, are skeptical
that that is true?
A

You have to ask Dr. Zone on that.

without, again, knowing what is in the iron.

I can't say
I'm not even

sure if I found out if you can do patch testing.

I'm sure
21

you can.

You know,

if

it is

stuff that is in

the iron, I

guess if it is something like an acid, or something, you can
put it on somebody's skin and they are obviously going to
react to it.

So I can't tell you without, you know, I can't

say for sure one way or the other.

Anything is possible

but, you know, I have not read it or heard of it.
Q

In the law, I assume you know, in medicine we

typically don't try to deal with possibilities but
probability.

If you put it in that realm, do you think the

iron is the probable cause of her problems?
A

Again, I can't say yes but, you know, I have never

heard of it happening before.
Q

So your answer to that is it is not probable?

A

I have n e v e r —

It is not probable in the sense

that I have never heard of that happening before.
Q

With contact dermatitis?

A

Yes.

Q

Is it the sort of thing that a person comes in

contact with something, I think you used the term a topical
agent?
A

Yes.

Q

Normally if you remove the topical agent, does the

dermatitis clear up or is it a permanent condition?
A

If you remove the topical agent, it will clear up,

yes, but you can also sometimes get cross sensitization.

In

other words, if you react to one t h i n g —
good example?

What would be a

If you have got contact with sulfa and then

you have a reaction to the sulfa, because it is in the same
category like penicillin, you can have some cross reaction.
It is hard to explain.
Q

You used, for example, earlier turpentine.

A

Right.

Q

You put turpentine on somebody's skin, and they

get a rash?
A

Right.

Q

Normally if you remove the turpentine and you

don't put it on their skin again, does the rash stay or go
away?
A

The rash should go away.

Q

As far as the causes of contact dermatitis, other

than what we have discussed, that is contact with a topical
agent, are there other causes of that?
A

You can get air pollutants, that's where you have

hay fever, for instance.
skin.

You can get a reaction to your

It is not necessarily a contact but it is like air

pollens.

Sometimes people will get eyelid dermatitis from

fingernail polish, from mascara, from just pollutants in the
air-type thing.

But many people usually have a history of

allergies to go along with that, too.
Q

Again, if you remove the pollutanrs, does rhat

23

generally go away?
A

It should, yes.

Q

If you have a situation where you suspect

something is causing a contact dermatitis and you remove
that item, but it doesn't go away, is that significant?
A
improve.

Yes.

You would think that the patient would

Sometimes you would get a cortisone-type cream to

help clear it up.

If you take the irritant away, I would

think that it would clear up.
Q

And if it doesn't clear up, would that medically

suggest to you that that probably wasn't the cause but it is
probably something else?
A

It might have been the initial cause but, again, I

don't know if that is going to be the only cause at that
point, you know, if you take it away.
Q

Is that one way to determine, as a dermatologist,

you try to identify causes, as you say, well, I think maybe
you are allergic to "X"?
A

Right.

Q

So we eliminate "X" from your environment, and if

it goes away you say, "Well, it probably was 'X'n?
A

Yes.

Q

If it doesn't go away, you say, "We probably

haven't found the problem.

We better look for something

else"?

24

1

2
3
4
5

7
8

10
11

A

Yes.

Q

Getting back to Exhibit A.

field?

By the way, what kind

A

We can go to about 2:30.

Q

Getting back to Exhibit A, you next saw the

A

Telephone message.

Q

Can you tell from looking at that what the reason

A

13

She called and she said she was having trouble

sleeping at night.

14

I had her on prednisone, which is an

oral cortisone, and sometimes people will have trouble

15

sleeping when they take oral cortisone.

16

That's why I tell

them to take it in the morning and maybe they will have less

17

of a problem at night sleeping, but it can cause some people

18

to have a little difficulty in sleeping.

19

Q

20

Okay.

And it appears that caffeine was also

something that was a concern during that phone call?

21

25

I s t h a t an a c c e p t e d m e t h o d i n y o u r

for the telephone conversation was?

12

24

0

patient on February 12, 1988, or is that a telephone call?

9

23

True.

of time frame are working with here, Doctor?

6

22

A

I

A

Yes.

Q

Were you able to determine whether her sleeping

problem was the caffeine or the prednisone?
A

I couldn't say.

Q

The next note on your chart is 2-7-88.

Oh, before

25

A

No.

What many people do with hot showers, is the

fine cutaneous nerves, it will take away the itching for
them initially, and then when they get out the problem
starts itching more.

It will dry her out more, the water

will do that.
Q

So that is something that you would recommend

against?

I

A

I wouldn't tell her to do that.

Q

I assume that you see hundreds of people a year in J

your practice; is that a fair statement?

i
t

t\

x es.

i
I
t

Q

Is this a fairly unusual case or is this a fairly j

typical case that Mrs. Davis has?
A

We see a lot of people with contact dermatitis in

our practice and in varying degrees.

The most common we see j

like hands, because people put their hands in irritants, and ;
that is the main thing that you see, but you can see people
with contact dermatitis.

I

Q

Are there unusual aspects to this case?

|

A

Referring to her medical skin problem?

j

o>

V — •—

A

No.

dermatitis.

!

She just has a bad case of contact

j

I mean she is severe.

Q

Okay.

A

If that is what you mean.

j
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1

EXAMINATION

2

BY MR. DAVIS:

I do have some things.

Do you

3

recall whether or not 01 Eve talked to you about chemicals

4

in the iron and determining what those chemicals are before

5

she takes a patch test?

6

A

She mentioned that it would be good to get what is

7

in the iron, the chemicals, before she gets the patch test.

8

That is probably a good idea.

9
10
11

Q

What would be the reason for knowing those

chemicals?
A

Well, so that they could be patch tested, however

12

the thing goes.

13

the iron, the chemicals.

14

chemicals directly on your skin, they are going to be

15

abrasive and caustic, I'm sure, but I am not sure he is

16

going to be able to patch test her for that per se, or if he

17

does patch test her, I'm sure he is going to have to dilute

18 i it way down.
19
20

It is depending—

If you put something of these

If you put an acid on a person, they are going

to react to it.
Q

I don't know what is in

I don't know what is in the iron.

Is one of the reasons for knowing the chemicals to

21

do the patch test just to reduce the size of the universe

22

that you have to test for?

23

A

Y e s , t h a t would b e v e r y h e l p f u l .

24

Q

Do you recall whether or not Mrs. Davis brought to

25

your attention

the fact that she made the decision to

stop
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years of dermatology residency, finishing in 1977 at the
University of Buffalo, and then in the last six months of
1977, I was in an immunology fellowship at the University of
Buffalo, and that finished my formal training, and I have
been on the faculty since January 1st of 1978.
Q

I assume you are aware that we are here to take

your deposition because of a lawsuit that Mrs. 01 Eve Davis
has filed against my client, Black and Decker.
A

Yes.

Q

And I understand at some point in time you treated

Mrs. Davis.
A

Yes.

Q

Can you tell me when you first saw her?

A

I saw her on one occasion, October 19, 1983.

sorry.

1989.

Q

What was the occasion for your seeing her?

A

I'm sorry.

something different.
1989.

I'm

I'm wrong on this.

I'm looking at

I saw her on one occasion September 6,

I'm looking at a different location in the chart.

Q

What was the occasion for your seeing her?

A

She was referred to me for evaluation.

Dr. Leo

Sotiriou referred her to me.
Q

What was your understanding as to what her problem

was at the time she was referred to you?
A

That she had a pruritus, or itching dermatitis
4

t

involving her trunk.

2

Q

I see you are referring to a letter in your file.

3

A

Right.

4

Q

Is that the report that you wrote to D r . Sotiriou?

5

A

Y e s , it is a letter dated September 6, 1 9 8 9 , my

6
7
8
9

referral letter after having evaluated M r s . D a v i s .
Q
letter.
A

10
11

It appears to m e that I only have one p a g e of that
Excuse m e .

There it i s , it is two-sided.

It is on the back.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

I'm going to have the reporter

m a r k that as Exhibit 1 to your deposition.

12

(Exhibit 1 marked for identification.)

13

MR. DAVIS:

14

medical records here?

15
16
17
18

Do you have copies of t h e r e s t of her

MR. CHRISTENSEN:
Q

I believe I d o .

(By M r . Christensen)

Did you form an opinion as

to what her problems w e r e ?
A

At the time I examined M r s . D a v i s , she didn't have

19

an active eruption on her chest and back.

It w a s a

20

historical point.

21

including her biopsies that had been done previously at the

22

M a y o Clinic, and at that time she showed me some pictures

23

t h a t had apparently been taken during the point w h e r e her

24

disease was active.

25

it was my impression that she had a chronic type of eczema,

W h a t I did was to review h e r r e c o r d s ,

On the basis of that information, and

whether or not this was related t o — I put down here possibly
contact dermatitis, although I couldn't tell, since I didn't
actually see her when she was broken out.
The biopsies done at the Mayo Clinic, which she
allowed me to see, apparently were suggestive of cutaneous
T-cell lymphoma, which is a type of cancer of the lymph
cells in the skin but, however, a definite diagnosis of that
could not be made, so it was my overall opinion that at the
time I saw her that she had eczema and no more definitive
statement could be made.
Q

Now, you indicated that she let you see some

biopsies?
A
reports.

Well, photographs.

I guess what I saw was biopsy

She had two biopsies done which said she had a

contact dermatitis.

I saw biopsy reports.

I don't think I

actually saw biopsy slides, that I recall, anyway.
Q

Was it your comment in your letter, and I'm

referring now to the second page of the letter.
A

Yes.

Q

"I cannot rule out the possibility that she may

have cutaneous T-cell lymphoma."
A

Yes.

Q

Was that based on your personal observations or

what is that based on?
A

That was based on the history and information that

6

I was given in the records because when I saw Mrs. Davis she
wasn't actually broken out with any particular eruptions.
Q

Let me review briefly with you the top of the

second page of the letter.
the time that I saw her."

"She did not have any lesions at
Did she have anything that you

could look at?
A

The physical exam that I performed and the

objective information that I accumulated at that time are
listed in that paragraph.

It says that I reviewed the

pictures, which apparently looked to me to be some
erythematous papules, and bumps, and on examining her I
could find no evidence of lymph node enlargement, which is
adenopathy, that her liver and spleen were, in my estimate,
normal, and, consequently my physical exam at the time I saw
her was negative.
MR. DAVIS:

Negative for what?

THE WITNESS:

Negative for the things that I just

mentioned, for the presence of lymph nodes, for the presence
of liver enlargement, for the presence of splenic
enlargement, and for the presence of eruptions on her back
or chest.
Q

(By Mr. Christensen)

Did she have any abnormal

skin condition when you saw her?
A

Apparently not.

I write in my letter that, "She

did not have any lesions at this time."

7

Q

She apparently indicated to you that she felt some

of the skin problems she had were related to an iron that
she had ironed some blouses with.

Do you recall that?

A

I remember her telling me that, yes.

Q

Do you have an opinion as to whether the problems

she is describing related to that iron?
A

Well, that was a peculiar history because I had

never heard of such a thing happening, so my tendency was to
say that it was not related, although, because I had never
heard of any similar sequence of events occurring.
Q

So would it be your judgment that her problems are

probably not related to that iron?
A

That would be my best judgment.
MR. DAVIS:

I object to causation questions, as

yesterday, as being improper inasmuch as the defendant holds
the key to the identity of the chemicals in the iron and has
not made those available yet.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

We don't necessarily agree with

that, but you have made your record.
Q

(By Mr. Christensen)

in the middle of your answer.

I think you got interrupted
Were you finished?

A

I don't remember what the question was.

Q

Is it your judgment that her problems are probably

not related to the iron?
A

Yes, that would be my answer to that.
o
O

1
2
3

Q

Were you aware that she had been diagnosed by Dr.

Sotiriou as having atopic eczema and contact dermatitis?
A

No, I wasn't at the time I saw her.

I didn't have

4

a letter of referral, unless she mentioned to me, I don't

5

remember it nor do I have any record of it.

6
7
8
9

Q

As of the time that you saw her, what information

did you have other than that we have already discussed?
A

The information that I had was a series of letters

as well as the pictures that I mentioned previously, a

10

series of copies of Xeroxed medical records from the Mayo

11

Clinic, including laboratory results, a letter from Dr.

12

Kristin Leiferman.

13

Q

Can you give us the date on that letter?

14

A

Sure.

July 13, 1989.

I guess I do have letters.

15

I have a record from—I can't say for sure who this is from.

16

I have office notes from 2-5-89, 2-12-88, 2-7-88.

17

is signed.

18

Q

Let me do this.

Let me just mark those. I believe

19

I have a copy of your file.

20

Can you tell me if that is the same one?

21

A

24
25

Let me hand you this document.

That is the document I am referring to.

22
23

This one

(Exhibit 2 marked for identification.)
Q

Exhibit
A

(By M r . C h r i s t e n s e n )

I h a v e had t h a t marked

2.
I also have a letter from Mrs. Davis to Dr.

as

substances are applied to the skin that are irritating the
skin in a nonspecific way, much like any irritating
substance being applied to anyone's skin would produce a
type of irritation.

Those are the two types of contact

dermatitis.
Q

Can you determine, from what information you have

here, which type Mrs. Davis had?
A

No.

Q

Do you need to do a patch testing to do that?

A

We prefer to do patch testing to try to establish

specific allergic reactions to substances that could then be
implicated into the clinical situation and explain the
disorder.
Q

What causes atopic dermatitis?

A

Atopic dermatitis is believed to be hereditary in

nature and is a condition in which the skin is inherently
irritable.

The exact mechanism by which the lesion occurs

is uncertain, but it is known to be associated with asthma,
hay fever, and on occasion, although not necessarily, may be
accentuated by dryness, and by irritating substances applied
to the skin.
Q

After reviewing the 1983 new patient evaluation

sheet, and the other documents we have looked at, does it
appear to you that the problems Mrs. Davis was complaining
of in September of 1989 when you saw her were essentially

24

1

substances are applied to the skin t h a t are irritating the

2

skin in a nonspecific w a y , much like any

3

substance being applied to anyone's skin would p r o d u c e a

4

type of irritation.

5

dermatitis.

6

Q

7

irritating

Those are the two types of c o n t a c t

Can you d e t e r m i n e , from w h a t information you have

h e r e , which type M r s . Davis h a d ?

8

A

No.

9

Q

Do you need to do a patch testing to do t h a t ?

10

A

We prefer t o do patch testing to try t o establish

11

specific allergic reactions to substances that c o u l d then be

12

implicated into the clinical situation and e x p l a i n the

13

disorder.

14

Q

What causes atopic d e r m a t i t i s ?

15

A

Atopic dermatitis is believed to b e h e r e d i t a r y in

16

nature and is a condition in w h i c h the skin is inherently

17

irritable.

18

is uncertain, b u t it is known to be associated w i t h a s t h m a ,

19

hay fever, and on o c c a s i o n , although n o t n e c e s s a r i l y , may be

20

accentuated by d r y n e s s , and by irritating s u b s t a n c e s applied

2^

to the skin.

22 I

Q

The exact mechanism by which the lesion occurs

After reviewing the 1983 new patient

evaluation

23

s h e e t , and the other documents we have looked a t , does it

24

appear to you that the problems M r s . Davis w a s c o m p l a i n i n g

25

of in September of 1989 when you saw her w e r e e s s e n t i a l l y

24

the same as she had as far back as 1983?
A

It is impossible for me to say that because I

didn't see her in 1983, but the symptoms, certainly the
location of the complaint was similar, and it was the type
of eczema or dermatitis, and, by the way, the term eczema
and dermatitis are used synonymously in dermatology, so,
certainly the distribution and the history were in similar
areas, yes.
Q

Do you have a judgment as to whether the problem

had become worse or stayed about the same?
A

Well, when I examined her on September 6th, 1989,

I note that she had no lesions, that she did not have any
lesions at that time, and apparently when she was examined
by Dr. Reese in 1983, she did have lesions, so it would have
appeared that it got better, just based on the information
on those two visits to the University of Utah Medical
Center.
Q

You stated earlier that dermatitis and eczema are

synonymous in dermatology.
A

They are used synonymously by clinicians and

literally they aren't totally synonymous but that is the way
they are used.
Q

So is atopic eczema—

A

An atopic dermatitis would refer to the same

condition.
25

1
2

Q

What about atopic eczema and contact dermatitis;

would they be the same?

3

A

No.

4

Q

What is the difference between those two?

5

A

Contact dermatitis implies that a topical or

6

externally applied agent is believed to be responsible for

7 I the disorder and atopic dermatitis is believed that patients
on the genetic or hereditary basis have an inherent tendency
9 I to have their skin become irritated.

Now, certain people

10

with atopic dermatitis can develop problems from contact,

11

but atopic, the term atopic dermatitis as it is used by most

12

physicians refers to an inherent genetic or hereditary

13

tendency to develop dermatitis.

14

Q

I'm going to show you a document which I have in a

15

set and I'm not sure if that is from your file.

16

we will mark it, if not I won't.

17

A

Yes, I have this in my file.

If it is,

It is part of the

18

information received as copies from the Mayo Clinic.

19

a hospital medical admission form.

20

21

(Exhibit 10 marked for identification.)

Q

(By Mr. Christensen)

22

6, 1 9 8 9 —

23

f i l e t h a t you

24
25

It is

A
September

In your letter of September

By the way, is that the only document in your

Yes.

generated?
I apparently

examined the patient

6 t h , 1 9 8 9 , and w h e n I s e e c o n s u l t a t i o n s

on
from

other

26

1

d e r m a t o l o g i s t s , and D r . Sotiriou is another d e r m a t o l o g i s t , I

2

always dictate them a letter a t t h a t t i m e of m y f i n d i n g s ,

3

and this letter or note from t h a t d a y , I u s e t h e letter a n d

4

the note as the s a m e , and then I g a v e h e r an a p p o i n t m e n t t o

5

return on September 1 3 , 1 9 8 9 , for w h i c h she did n o t r e p o r t .

6

Q

7

A

No.

8

Q

But the September 6th letter served t h a t dual

9

You didn't k e e p h a n d w r i t t e n notes?

purpose?

10

A

Right.

it

Q

Your letter s t a t e s , "This woman h a s never been

12

patch tested and I would like t h e opportunity t o p a t c h t e s t

13

h e r a t some p o i n t . "

14

A

She is on prednisone c o n t i n u a l l y .

Prednisone

15

negates the patch t e s t , s o if o n e w e r e to have a p o s i t i v e

16

patch test, it would be n e g a t i v e w h e n the patient is taking

17

prednisone.

18

Q

19

prednisone?

20

A

2'
22

So normally y o u need t o g e t them o f f t h e

You need to g e t t h e p a t i e n t off p r e d n i s o n e , and

then after three to four w e e k s p a t c h test them.
Q

W a s that your p l a n , w a s t o g e t her off t h e

23 I p r e d n i s o n e and t h e n d o t h e p a t c h

24
25

A
prednisone

test?

I say, "Hopefully I will b e able to taper h e r
in t h e f u t u r e and t h e n p a t c h t e s t h e r . "

That

was

27
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OL EVE LOOMIS DAVIS,
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the State of Utah, and a subsidiary of Black and Decker
Corporation, Inc. and BLACK and
DECKER CORPORATION, INC., (a
Maryland corporation,
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STATE OF UTAH

:

COUNTY- OF SALT LAKE :
I, Leonard J. Swinyer, M.D., being first duly sworn upon
oath, do hereby testify as follows:
1.

I am a medical doctor specializing in dermatology,

currently engaged in the private practice of medicine in Salt Lake
City, Utah.
2.
dermatopathology.

I

am

board

certified

in

dermatology

and

I have been a licensed physician since 1966 and
-1-

board certified in Dermatology since 1973.
3. Contact dermatitis and contact eczema have been areas
of emphasis in my practice and I am generally considered as one of
the leading experts in Salt Lake City in those areas.
4.

I was retained as a dermatology expert by the

attorneys representing Black & Decker in the above case to conduct
a

dermatology

analysis

and

examination

plaintiff, 01 Eve Loomis Davis.

with

respect

to the

I saw Mrs. Davis in my office on

February 25, 1992.
5.
photographs

As

part

provided

dermatological

of my

in this

conditions

at

analysis
case
issue

by
in

I have
the

reviewed

the

plaintiff

of the

case.

I also

this

interviewed Mrs. Davis, reviewed her deposition and reviewed the
written medical history she provided.

I have also reviewed the

following medical records and materials:
a.

Records of Dr. Leo Sotiriou;

b.

Records of the University of Utah Dermatology

Clinic, Dr. John Zone;
c.

Records of the University

of Utah OB/GYN

Department;
d.

Records of the Ear, Nose and Throat Center of

Salt Lake City, Dr. Glen K. Lund;
e.
6.

The depositions of Drs. Sotiriou and Zone.

Based

on my

own examination,

as well

as the

statements of Mrs. Davis and the information she provided, it was
-2-

apparent to me that on the date of the examination, (February 25,
1992), Mrs. Davis' skin was clear and free of any of the skin
conditions which Mrs. Davis describes in her deposition and/or
which are depicted in the photographs which she has provided.
7.

Mrs. Davis informed me that her skin became clear

last June or July, spontaneously, and has remained clear since. It
is

my

understanding

that

she

is

not

currently

taking

any

medications for contact dermatitis or contact eczema, and that she
was not taking such medications since her skin cleared.
8.
and

interview

Based on my training and experience, my examination
of Mrs. Davis, my

review

of the photographs,

depositions and medical records and the other information I have
been provided, as well as *my professional judgment, it is my
opinion that Mrs. Davis' skin conditions, (which she has described
and as depicted in the photographs which she supplied), were not
the result of chemicals or chemical compounds emitted from the
Black & Decker iron which she describes in her deposition.
9.

It

is

apparent

from

the

medical

records and

depositions that Mrs. Davis had contact eczema and/or contact
dermatitis prior to 1987, which is when she has stated that she
purchased the Black & Decker iron.
10. Based on the information which has been provided to
me, I believe that her pre-existing contact eczema and/or contact
dermatitis may have been produced by formaldehyde resins commonly
found in some fabrics used in women's clothing.
-3-

I)ATED t h i s

1

day ot

Jjpf%\) 1 9 9 2 .

•^QJJ.Ji^

hv>.

Leoriard J. styinyer, jfyD/
w

'lY'i.^
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
Ap*ilY 1992-

Notary Public^.

A-

day of

r

Residing at: si {[ (^CT
My commission expires:

IL^^j^

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
J hereby certify that on the

day of April, 1992, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Leonard J.
Swinyer, M>D- was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid to:
Elmer Thomas Davis, Jr.
Attorney for Plaintiff
1181 Chandler Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
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Tab 10

Elmer Thomas Davis, Jr.,827
Attorney for Plaintiff
1181 Chandler Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
(801)521-9529
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
OL EVE LOOMIS DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BLACK AND DECKER (U.S.), INC. (a
Maryland Corporation authorized
to do business in the State of Utah,
and a subsidiary of Black and Decker
Corporation, Inc.)
and
BLACK AND DECKER CORPORATION, INC.
(A Maryland corporation.)

PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO STRIKE
AFFIDAVIT OF
DR. SWINYER
DATED, 4 MAY 1992.

Civil Number
89-0907651CV
Judge R. H. Moffat

Defendants

Comes now the plaintiff, by and through her attorney, and
moves the Court to strike the affidavit given by Dr. Leonard J.
Swinyer, M.D., dated 4 May 1992, and offered as a supporting exhibit to defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 6 August
1992, against plaintiff on the issue of causation.
This motion is made on the ground that although Dr. Swinyer is
a board certified dermatologist and is competent to testify with
respect to certain aspects of this case which lie within his experience and training in dermatology, he is not competent to testify

4

~>

*

as to causation in this case for the following reasons.
1. The essence of causation in this case involves certain
chemicals which were indisputably manufactured into the defendants'
"The Classic" metal steam iron and the mechanism by which such
chemicals were transported to plaintiff's skin to cause her injuries. (See Exhibit 1, Affidavit by Elmer T. Davis, Dated 12 June
1991, which identifies the location of some 12 sites within the
iron at which defendants have used largely unidentified sealants,
coatings, fluxes, thermal and electrical insulation. (See Amended
Complaint, Number 1, Page 4, Paragraphs 9b,c, and d.)
2. Dr. Swinyer's affidavit does not indicate on its face
that Dr. Swinyer has ever seen "The Classic" metal steam iron or a
picture of one, that he has ever seen inside of the iron or viewed
pictures of the interior of the iron that show the locations of
said chemicals, that he has seen the chemical products involved as
they have been used in the iron, that he knows the identities of
the chemicals making up such products, that he knows the characteristics of the chemicals of such products, that he knows that in
fact these chemicals were not transferred from the iron to
plaintiff's skin, that he knows that the chemicals in defendants'
iron, if they were transported to plaintiff's skin, did not cause
plaintiff's injuries. (See Exhibit 2, Affidavit of Dr. Swinyer,
Paragraphs 5a through e and Paragraph 8.)
3. In short, Dr. Swinyer's opinion as expressed in Para/' r"/i

graphs 5a through e and Paragraph 8 of his affidavit is based on
hearsay, which is not germane to the iron, the chemicals it
contains or to the issue of causation, and the affidavit does not
show on its face that it is "made on personal knowledge" as required by Rule 56e, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Dr. Swinyer,

therefore, is not competent, based on his affidavit, to testify as
an expert on the issue of causation in this case. His affidavit is
not admissible as proof that plaintiff's injuries were not caused
by defendants' iron. Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747(Utah ,
1985) and it is, therefore, subject to a motion to strike. Howick
v. Bank of Utah, 28 Utah 2d 64, 498 P.2d 353[2 ] (1972).
WHEREFORE the Court should strike the affidavit of Dr. Leonard
J. Swinyer, M.D., dated 4 May 1992, when used for the purpose of
supporting defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

Dated and submitted this the 25th day of August, 1992.

Elmer Thomas Davis, Jr.
Attorney for Plaintiff

EXHIBIT 1
to
PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF DR. SWINYER, DATED 4 MAY 1992
Civil Number 89-090765ICV
Judge Richard H. Moffat

ATTACHMENT #1, to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Plaintifffs Motion
For Order Compelling More Complete Answers to Plaintiff's
Interrogatories,(Set) Number 3.

STATE OF UTAH

:
ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE:

I, Elmer T. Davis, Jr., at the request of, and on behalf of, the
plaintiff did, during the month of September 1990, disassemble one new "The
Classic" metal steam iron of "Lot" Number 004. Having done so, the
following observations are noted.
1. Without special tools, one must destroy the water fill funnel
in order to disassemble the iron. Therefore, once having disassembled the
iron, it is impossible to reassemble it to its original condition, without
having a replacement water fill funnel.
2. There is a white sealant used at several points on the water
reservoir.
3. There is an ink-like coating used on the water reservoir and
on the thermostatic control assembly.
4. There is a white sealant, similar in appearance to the one
mentioned in 2. above, used, not as a sealant for liquid but instead as an
electrical insulation, at several points on the thermostatic control
assembly.

.

f

i CERTFYTHATTHIS IS ATRUE COFY C- A
0HK3INAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THIF.-J
DISTRICT QOURT, SALT LAKE ,CCU:;TY
- 1SIATEXJF fr&?> I ^ C ?

— ^^'fe(:

5. There is a white sealant, similar in appearance to the one
mentioned in 2. above, used as a sealant for steam and liquid at the
interface of the steam chamber with the ceramic nozzle which controls the
flow of water to the steam chamber. This material comes in contact with the
steam.
6. There is a rubber-like washer at the interface of the water
reservoir and the ceramic nozzle and a second rubber-like washer at the
interface of the ceramic nozzle and the steam chamber. Both washers are
subjected to the heat of the iron when in use and would contribute to the
fumes.
7. There is a white(gray) paste-like sealant at the common
surfaces of the two castings which comprise the steam chamber. This
material comes in contact with the steam.
8. There appears to be a white coating on the unpolished surface
of the soleplate casting. This material comes in contact with the steam and
could erode or otherwise be picked up by the steam and deposited on ironed
clothing.
9. The water reservoir, is stamped out of a brass-like material,
and a lubricant could have been used to facilitate the stamping process. If
so, such lubricant could constitute a contaminating residue which would
contribute to the fumes breathed by plaintiff and/or be picked up by the
water and ultimately transferred to plaintiff's ironed clothes.
10. The inner surface of the water reservoir could have been
coated. If so, such coating comes in contact with the water and could

n£

.2.

C- /—.. /^

thereby be transmitted to the steam chamber and thence to the plaintiff's
ironed clothes.
11. At at least two electrical connection points a flux was used
to make the soldered or brazed connection. Such flux was readily visible
and had not been cleaned from the iron inspected, so constitutes a
contaminating residue which would contribute to the fumes emitted by the
iron when hot.
12. The power cord has a rubberlike insulation which is subjected
to heat when the iron is in use and could therefore contribute to the fumes
emitted when iron is hot.
13. There is an insulation material surrounding the heating
element which prevents shorting to the sole plate casting. This material
could contribute to the fumes emitted when the iron is hot.
14. All of the chemicals making up the compounds identified above
and any chemicals of compounds not here mentioned and used in aid of
manufacture, such as cleaners, lubricants and solvents which leave a
residue on parts incorporated into the iron, could contribute to the fumes
breathed by plaintiff when she performed the "Before First Use" cleaning
procedure, and some could contaminate the steam during use of the iron for
a long period of time.
Executed on this the 12th day of June, 1991, at Salt Lake City, State
of Utah.

STATE OF UTAH
ss,
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE:

On the 12ff~ day of June, 1991, personally appeared before me, Elmer
Thomas Davis, Jr., who executed the foregoing declaration in my presence.

~^fs.*~~
My commission expires:

J^C^^

3TARY
ARY PUBLIC I'
J} y
Res iding at d'OCJr',^^1^*
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EXHIBIT 2
to
PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDVIT OF DR. SWINYER, DATED 4 MAY 1992
Civil Number 89-0907651CV
Judge Richard H. Moffat

• if J

Roger P. Christensen, #0648
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
Attorney for Black and Decker
510 Clark Learning Building
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 3 55-34 31
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
OL EVE LOOMIS DAVIS,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF
LEONARD J. SWINYER, M.D.

vs.
BLACK AND DECKER (U.S.j^

INC.,

(a Maryland corporation
authorized to do business in
the State of Utah, and a subsidiary of Black and Decker
Corporation, Inc. and BLACK *and
DECKER CORPORATION, INC., (a
Maryland corporation,

Civil No. 89-0907651 CV
Judge Moffatt

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

:

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE :
I, Leonard J. Swinyer, M.D., being first duly sworn upon
oath, do hereby testify as follows:
1.

I am a medical doctor specializing in dermatology,

currently engaged in the private practice of medicine in Salt Lake
City, Utah.
2.
dermatopathology.

I

am

board

certified

in

dermatology

and

I have been a licensed physician since 1966 and
-1-

board certified in Dermatology since 1973.
3. Contact dermatitis and contact eczema have been areas
of emphasis in my practice and I am generally considered as one of
the leading experts in Salt Lake City in those areas.
4.

I was

retained

as a dermatology

expert

by the

attorneys representing Black & Decker in the above case to conduct
a

dermatology

analysis

and

examination

plaintiff, 01 Eve Loomis Davis.

with

respect

to

the

I saw Mrs. Davis in my office on

February 25, 1992.
5.
photographs

As

part

provided

dermatological

of

in

my

analysis

this

case

at

issue

conditions

by
in

I

have

the

reviewed

the

plaintiff

of

the

case.

I

also

this

interviewed Mrs. Davis, reviewed her deposition and reviewed the
written medical history she provided.

I have also reviewed the

following medical records and materials:
a.

Records of Dr. Leo Sotiriou;

b.

Records of the University of Utah Dermatology

Clinic, Dr. John Zone;
c.

Records

of

the

University

of

Utah

OB/GYN

Department;
d.

Records of the Ear, Nose and Throat Center of

Salt Lake City, Dr. Glen K. Lund;
e.
6.

The depositions of Drs. Sotiriou and Zone.

Based

on

my

own

examination,

as

well

as

the

statements of Mrs. Davis and the information she provided, it was
-2-

apparent to me that on the date of the examination, (February 25,
1992), Mrs, Davis' skin was clear and free of any of the skin
conditions which Mrs. Davis describes in her deposition and/or
which are depicted in the photographs which she has provided.
7.

Mrs. Davis informed me that her skin became clear

last June or July, spontaneously, and has remained clear since. It
is

my

understanding

that

she

is

not

currently

taking

any

medications for contact dermatitis or contact eczema, and that she
was not taking such medications since her skin cleared.
8.
and

Based on my training and experience, my examination

interview

of

Mrs.

Davis,

my

review

of

the

photographs,

depositions and medical records and the other information I have
been provided,

as well as my professional

judgment,

it is my

opinion that Mrs. Davis' skin conditions, (which she has described
and as depicted in the photographs which she supplied), were not
the result of chemicals or chemical compounds emitted from the
Black & Decker iron which she describes in her deposition.
9.

It

is

apparent

from

the

medical

records

and

depositions that Mrs. Davis had contact eczema and/or contact
dermatitis prior to 1987, which is when she has stated that she
purchased the Black & Decker iron.

r

10.

Based on the information which has been provided to

me, I believe that her pre-existing contact eczema and/or contact
dermatitis may have been produced by formaldehyde resins commonly
found in some fabrics used in women's clothing.
-3-

DATED this

H/

day
of>pfTTJ
day of
AplTll 1992.

Leonard J. Syinyer, f y D /
~;iY«'£'Subscribed and sworn to before me this
April/ 1992.

/: «^A /~V

jf\
*—

day of

> 7

Notary Public^. ,
Residing at: ^ ( ' . £v7~
My commission expires: /£ /~^2.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

day of April, 1992, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Leonard J.
Swinyer, tt.D. was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid to:
Elmer Thomas Davis, Jr.
Attorney for Plaintiff
1181 Chandler Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I do hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Motion
to Strike the Affidavit of Dr. Swinyer, dated 4 May 1992, has been
mailed, postage paid, addressed to the following, this
day of
August, 1992:
Roger P. Christensen, Esquire
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.
510 Clark Learning Building
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

j.:fcu'

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Certificate of
Service

OL EVE LOOMIS DAVIS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs .

Case No. 920224 CA

BLACK AND DECKER (U.S.), INC. (a
Maryland Corporation authorized
to do business in the State of Utah,
and a subsidiary of Black and Decker
Corporation, Inc.)
and
BLACK AND DECKER CORPORATION, INC.
(a Maryland corporation.)

Appeal from Third
Judicial Court of
Salt Lake County.
The Honorable
R. H. Moffat
Dist . Ct. Judge

Defendants and Appellees.

I certify that I have this, the 31st day of August, 1993,
delivered two copies of Appellant's Brief on Appeal of a
Summary Judgment, to defendants by hand delivery to the office
of:
Roger P. Chistensen, Esq.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C
Atty For Defendants/Appellants
510 Clark Learning Building
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 8>H0
Davis

